The Arab Spring and Revolution

Analysis of the Role of Socioeconomics and Political structures

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Introduction

This book examines the reasons behind the rebellions known as the Arab Spring that the MENA region has been witnessing. The expression “Arab Spring” is a sort of umbrella term used to describe the 2011 upheavals in an area spread out geographically and structured distinctively. It defines the Arab World and its structure. As well as the meaning of “Arab Spring”; the meaning of revolution that includes the theories and essence of revolution and the Arab malady; the causes of the Arab Spring and the examination of its usefulness in understanding the recent uprising and in what way this last has led to the revolution or revolt in most of the MENA regions; and at the end the conclusion.

The fundamental focus of this study will be recognizing and investigating the Arab Spring, including its conceptualization and historicizing, along with exploring the source of the term “Spring” and its helpfulness in qualifying the developments that occurred starting December 2010. The section begins by addressing what the expression "Arab Spring" itself alludes to, and why it came to be the favored expression, as opposed to Arab Revolution, Arab Awakening, or Arab Uprisings. An investigation of the word “Spring” with regards to the Arab revolts since 2011 uncovers that the term does not truly mirror the phenomena under consideration, especially as it invokes ethno-national assumptions about the MENA region that are not necessarily shared between the different countries involved. Besides, the term fails to address
the variability of the financial and political structures of these nations, which is plausibly the reason why the early “Spring” or multinational dissents of 2010-2011 resulted in different outcomes in each of the countries. Consequently, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Libya will be studied to highlight the distinctiveness of their structures and argue for the lack of a shared trait between them that would legitimize lumping the events that occurred in those nations together as the "Arab Spring".
What is the Arab World?

The Arab World defines a geographical and cultural field, and the Arab World consequently refers to the inhabitants who live in that cultural world. From a geographical perspective, the Arab World is the land that stretches from North Africa to the western border of Iran and from the southern border of Turkey to the Horn of Africa. The Arab World includes twenty-two states: Bahrain, Comoros, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Djibouti, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestinians Territories, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. The dominant language in the Arab World is Arabic.
Is the Arab World Homogenous? In spite of the fact that most inhabitants of the Arab world are Arab-speaking Muslims, the Arab World is not homogenous. More specifically, Muslims are divided into two sects, Sunni and Shi’as. The dissent between these two branches is related to the history of Islam following the death of Prophet Muhammad, particularly regarding the leadership of the Islamic community. Each of these branches has developed its own beliefs and traditions. Shia is the major branch in Bahrain and Iraq, while Sunni is predominant in other Arab Countries. There are large differences between the two sects. They have contrasting sets of rituals and traditions and they are divided based on their conflicting interests. Another Muslim sect is Alawites. The Alawite sect is the ruling group in Syria, while it constitutes only about 13 percent of the Syrian population. There is also a Christian population in the Arab World, including Maronite Christians in Lebanon, Coptic Christians in Egypt, and Orthodox Christians throughout the region. Insofar as ethnic minorities are concerned, Kurds living in the Arab World live in Syria and Iraq and they have their own language.
What is the ‘The Arab Spring’? According to Souza and Lipietz (2010), the “Arab Spring” alludes to the social developments and uprisings that emerged towards the end of 2010 in Tunisia, and which eventually proliferated all through the MENA in the following years (Souza & Lipietz, 2011). These uprisings and rebellions extended over the Maghreb and Middle East, to reach Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and a part of the Gulf States. Friedman (2011) and others define the Arab Spring as a political uprising that was carried out by mass populaces requesting liberal democratic reform with Western support, but the requests of these populaces were not solely related to liberal democratic change, and the West only interfered to accomplish its own particular geostrategic interests (Friedman, 2011).¹ In fact, the most important effect of the Arab Spring in the West has been to impose a reevaluation of the on-going US strategy of giving political, monetary, and discretionary support to authoritarian regimes, which ensure balance in the Mena as is argued later. The protests originated from the acknowledgment of the demonstrators that they may have the capacity to oust the despots and their autocracy regimes by going out to streets and requesting change. From another point of view, Tariq Ramadan (2012) portrayed these changes as an intellectual uprising as opposed to a political one, whereby the optimistic protestors

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¹ Friedman, 2011 in his book “Re-examining the Arab Spring”: “The belief was that the Arab Spring was a political uprising by masses demanding liberal democratic reform and that this uprising, supported by Western democracies, would generate sweeping political change across the Arab world.”
believed that they could change and expel existing regimes. Protest is therefore, in this view, an acknowledgment of the influence of people by people themselves as opposed to a genuine political revolution. Undoubtedly, such thoughts seem quite attractive for scholars and intellectuals in the West, while they are not perceived as truly applicable on the ground for the populations of the MENA region (Tariq Ramadan, 2012).

According to Friedman (2011) and Dodge (2012), the demonstrators’ goal was to produce important political change throughout the MENA area, and according to Clark (2013), they sought to achieve democracy and good government in their nations (Friedman, 2011); (Dodge, 2012); (Clark, 2013)). Accordingly, it was a moment of recognition of the general population of their unhappy reality, which was not necessarily new, but was, for the first time, accompanied by the novel acknowledgment of their power and desire to claim change. In this framework, the events of the Arab Spring spread hope and people believed that change was possible, yet what occurred after the uprisings in the Arab world did not meet their hopes. As Guzansky and Heller (2012) noticed, the uprisings that began in Tunisia were alarming to all the regimes in the MENA area, and that concern was progressively validated, as the flood of uprisings moved to different nations and demonstrators managed to topple authoritarian regimes like those of Ben Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak in
Al-Sayyad (2013) stated that the uprisings were very unexpected and surprising even to the educated Arabs who were part of the more extensive Arab social milieu, including political émigrés in the West for example. The mass support was the most stunning component as opposed to the uprisings themselves. Having languished over decades under stale or declining ways of life, with rising unemployment and nourishment costs and authoritarian regimes routinely abusing human rights, the people finally took to the streets demanding change (Al-Sayyad, 2013).

Some argue that social media (i.e. Facebook and Twitter) played an unequivocal part in waking sentiments of solidarity and facilitating the organizing of protests. However, the majority of the populaces of the Arab Spring nations are not Internet users and the greatest changes were witnessed in response to street demonstrations, as per Rosen (Rosen, 2011). Still, social media played an essential role in diffusing anti-regime publicity (e.g. recordings of police violence) and sorting out demonstrations. The area was living in hazardous conditions socially, financially, and politically, with expanding unemployment and regressing ways of life. The outcome was longstanding divisions in community, including sectarian and ethnic ones, which smashed the macro-level social unity over the preceding 20 years according to Al-
Sayyad (2013). Once more, this partitioning and the general social structure were not new or sudden phenomena, given that the area was controlled by oppression, and issues on multiple levels had been amassing for quite a long time. Therefore, cautious investigation of the region’s conditions can uncover the reality of the uprisings, the causes behind them, and their respective impacts on nations’ structures.

According to Henry (2011), the spark of the Arab Spring was first ignited on December 2010, when a young desperate vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in the city of Sidi Bouzid as a response to the confiscation of his wares, and to the humiliation and violence he had witnessed from Tunisian authorities (Henry, 2011). This incident provoked an uprising in Tunisia that quickly spread across to many other Arab states. People in Arab nations were aspiring for political freedom and better economic conditions. Pictures and stories of Mohamed’s frantic self-immolation spread over the whole Middle East, prompting a series of dissents, upheavals, and protests. This event was not novel and was not the first that had occurred in Tunisia. There were other demonstrations over economic issues in Tunisia’s poorer locales, but the difference was that what happened to Bouazizi was caught by cameras and spread on the web (Beaumont, 2011). Through social media and technology, upset and frustrated people (especially younger individuals) utilized the Internet to share pictures and recordings of the event, and found ripe ground
for profound disdain of regimes in the MENA region, beyond Tunisia. The long years of political restraint and financial stagnation, joined by the absence of services and the existing social imbalances, were all suddenly highlighted by the Bouazizi incident. Importantly however, one cannot comprehend the Arab Spring without further studying the fundamental socio-economic variables involved. This is where a more thorough analysis becomes important and the events in Tunisia and Egypt come to assume a vital role and qualify for a case study type of examination.

The incident of Bouazizi was on the primary page of a considerable number of newspapers; Facebook pages, gatherings, and campaigns, were set to highlight the story of Bouazizi’s demonstration against the Tunisian government. Online activists shared their stories and their issues, and then planned street demonstrations. And, according to Howard et al. (2011), social media assumed a focal role in forming political arguments in the Arab Spring (Howard & al, 2011).

Egypt followed Tunisia and rebelled against Mubarak’s government. Egyptians invaded Tahrir Square calling for equity and opportunity, as reported by Ramadan (Ramadan, 2011a). Driven by the Tunisian progression, especially after Ben Ali stepped down and fled the country in January 2011; numerous Egyptians began to feel that they could instigate similar change to
the Mubarak governance. It is true that Mubarak had constantly gotten strong support from numerous Egyptians, but a huge number of protestors in Tahrir Square clearly requested equality, liberty, a civil state, and above all democracy; and they knew that all those rights were not likely to be guaranteed under Mubarak’s rule. As the protests went on, they demanded the end of corruption, and more human rights and dignity (Murra, 2012). Finally, the protestors succeeded in ousting Mubarak, however, in actuality, the military foundation maintained control over the country. The imperative lesson here is that the uprisings were the result of awful circumstances that forced individuals to endure high rates of unemployment, neediness, inflation, and other economic troubles that were supposedly addressed by optimistic slogans and propaganda, which in reality never really tackled the fundamental system of authority (Owen, 2012).

The changes that occurred after the Bouazizi episode were named the Arab Uprising, the Arab Revolutions, and the Arab Awakening, assuming that Arabs were resting before the demonstration of Bouazizi, mirroring an old orientalist generalization of the languid and fatalistic Arab. However, at the end of the day, as said by Tarique Ramadan, the expression Arab Spring was the term that stuck (Tarique Ramadan, 2011d). The section below argues that the expression “Arab Spring” is an

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2 Tarique Ramadan, 2011d, p.136: “Arab Spring was the term that stuck”.

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inappropriate name for the uprisings that occurred in the MENA area in scientific terms.

**What is Revolution?**

The objective of this section is to elucidate the term “revolution” and assess the events that occurred in the MENA area compared to the definitions discussed. According to Kroeber (1996), we have to know how much has taken place, or been endeavored, to merit the name “revolution” (Kroeber, 1996). According to Stone (1966), revolution has been characterized as “a change that takes place following the utilization of brutality, in government, as well as ruling system, and society”\(^3\). Revolution here is intended to qualify the substitution of the old regime with another one that comes to control following the undertaking of violent activities, such as strikes or demonstrations. The author does not determine a particular kind of change; it may be an adjustment in rotating governments, an adjustment to the whole regime or some other revolutionary change in society (Stone, 1966). On another hand, after examining distinctive theories, sociologist Anthony Giddens devised a definition of the word “revolution” in relation to three components. He suggests that for any social activity to be named revolution it needs to be a mass social activity, be a process that will result in key and systemic changes, and to incorporate the utilization or the risk of utilization of brutality (Giddens, 2006).

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If the Arab Spring is to be tested for its qualification as “revolution” based on these three components, a mass social development did take place, but no central or fundamental change emerged. This conclusion can be made in light of the fact that the rebels’ principal request was to topple the authoritarian regimes, and not to carry out any reasonable social change. Moreover, the general atmosphere that reigned during the Arab Spring was a peaceful one, especially in Tunisia; while in Egypt fractions of the military and mercenaries were engaged in conflicts in Tahrir Square (Tziarras, 2011).

On a similar note, Perlmutter (1977) defined revolution as the downfall of a legitimately formalized government by rebels, in an illegal or forceful way, for the purpose of gaining functions in the structure of political authority (Perlmutter, 1977). This topple ought to be consolidated with an exceptional political, monetary, and social change as noted by Tanter and Midlarsky (Tanter & Midlarsky, 1967). Likewise, Gottschalk (1944) defined revolution as a popular movement which leads to a radical change in the structure of a society; and according to him, a topple of the current government and the substitution of another come right on time in such a development, and considerable social and monetary changes take place afterwards (Gottschalk, 1944). So, for an event to be a revolution, it ought to incorporate the following accompanying components: mass support, change in the governing elite, and also changes in economy and society. The revolutions are developments with some mass engagement.
that assume control over the state and alter its character in some fundamental way as noted by Kroeber (Kroeber, 1996). The limitation of revolution to social and political changes in previously discussed definitions neglects two historical components of revolutions: economy and religion. This means that these issues are not the focal point of most state apparatuses anymore; the secularization of countries, and the solidification of financial power in international banking structures implies that in spite of the fact that regimes are still targeted by revolutions, their real power is inside constrained social and political spaces.

On the other hand, Tanter and Midlarsky (1967) expressed the view that a successful revolution happens only when it leads to accomplishing every one of the objectives the revolutionaries set for it, and when they assume a role in shaping the new political system that prompts social and financial changes (Tanter & Midlarsky, 1967). Finally, revolutions imply dramatic, major changes in their full profundity, long-term, and multifaceted nature. Basically, the revolution is a barricade that ought to separate two facts, two life styles, and two political and monetary structures.
Theor
ties of Revolution

Revolution has, for quite some time, been a subject of heated discussion among researchers and political scholars. This study endeavors to examine the Arab Spring phenomenon, utilizing points of view drawn from the sociology of revolution. In this framework, the hypothesis of revolution is the first event examined in the MENA area. Different theories of revolution are inspected and considered in regard to their relevance to the Arab Spring as described by its causes and results.

The definition of revolution has been altered as new events have developed in recent history; one of the definitions was drawn from the social movement hypothesis. The meaning of an effective social revolution, as indicated by Skocpol (1985), is “a quick, fundamental change of a general society’s state and class structures, coming along with, and to some degree helped through by class-based revolutions from underneath” (Skocpol, 1985). Examination of social movements has greatly helped in elucidating forms of hidden upheavals, such as mass preparation, ideological clashes, and encounters with governments. Moreover, a portion of the radical social developments, similar to the US civil rights movement, achieved significant changes in the portioning of authority, according to Goldstone (2005). And as noticed by McAdam et al. (2001), these social developments can start a revolution as aggregate activities or conduct may be connected to

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political change and institutional reproductions. Importantly, what is decisive here is that for a revolt or revolution to be effective, individuals who go out to the streets and claim change must lead real social movements; and their requests must be achievable (McAdam & al, 2001).

As Goldstone (2005) noted, there is a shared set of central components that can indicate the occurrence of a revolutionary event. These components include eagerness and attempt to change the political system of government, formal and casual mass activation, and change to be imposed by means of non-systematized activities (protests, demonstrations, and strikes and so forth). Joining these components together gives a more extensive and modern definition of revolution that makes it not quite the same as revolts, uprisings, overthrows and, civil wars; and according to Goldstone (Goldstone, 2005), this definition is like a push to change the political establishments and the vindication for political authority in a community, joined by formal or casual mass assembly and non-regulated activities that undermine existing government. Consequently, a revolution must move power and its structure from one group to another. Once more, the end of the old regime is an absolute necessity and as Kroeber (1996) notes, this thought merges with another, that upheaval is fruitful only where a development upsets an administration (Kroeber, 1996).

Usually, revolutionary activists declare that they will lessen imbalance, deliver democracy, and lead to economic thriving as
noted by Weede and Muller (1997). This claim is not often achieved. Revolutions may be effective in overthrowing the old government, but it is quite difficult to set up a new one, and empower democracy and economic growth. In fact, this regime recreation adds a further hindrance to the conditions that were already preventing the old regime from making progress in the mentioned areas. Various types of revolutions are mostly comprehended as far as their results or players. The major revolutions incorporate change of social and economic aspects in addition to political foundations. Another sort of revolution is the political revolution, where changes happen only on the state institution’s level. Social revolutions are carried out by lower class revolts, as in the case of marginalized categories, according Skocpol (1985), while elite revolutions are carried out by elites who have full control over mass activation; they are called “upsets from above” as noted by Trimberger (Trimberger, 1978). Unsuccessful revolutions are those that lack the ability to secure power; oppositional activities that are not aiming to take power or stress mainly a specific group in society are called rebellions, regardless of whether they include fierce or calm demonstrations, according to Goldstone (2005).

There are diverse hypothesis on the reasons behind revolutions. Plato has always linked them to poverty, and to the distinction in economic interests in a society, and Aristotle agreed on this.

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perspective. However, Tocqueville did not approve of this approach and attributed revolutions to the rise in economic independence, security, and development (Tanter & Midlarsky, 1967).

**The essence of revolution**

The uprisings that ousted the regimes in Egypt and Tunisia and set off the rush of protests claiming democracy in the region are often expected to have had similar roots. Demonstrators in both nations were inspired by a comparable series of financial grievances and political objectives, according to the Economist Online (Economist, 2016). Both rebellions followed a comparable course of events, ending in the overthrow of the respective regimes.

In both nations a boundless feeling of financial disquietude was definitive in the events. While both Egypt and Tunisia encountered a time of strong economic development and had achieved market-accommodating economic changes, the vast majority of the population lived in tough conditions, as noted by the Economist Intelligence Data (2011). Particularly among the lower and middle classes, regression of wages, high inflation and rising unemployment have inflicted financial devastation. Job creation had occurred effectively in the low-gifted and low-wage divisions of the economy and was incapable of keeping pace with demographic development rates. According to the Economist

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6 The economist online source accessed in 2016
Intelligence Unit Country Data (Recorded Unemployment, 2010), this left middle-class youngsters unemployed and disillusioned with a political and monetary system in which individual relations outweighed capabilities, and where capitalism permitted those in influential positions to gather spectacular wealth. It was the lower working class youth that shaped the core of the ensuing rebellions.

Political suppression and the absence of essential opportunities was another critical impulse for demonstrators to rampage. While Tunisians had known few liberties under Ben Ali’s rule, Egyptians saw some of their liberties detracted from them as the government clamped down on public demonstrations and the autonomous media, and controlled parliamentary elections toward the end of last year. Police brutality and the mishandling of public authority had likewise been a part of everyday life in both nations and decay had been present at each level of society, but most unmistakably at the top. All of this led to a broad sentiment of frailty and estrangement, which explains the focal topics of “dignity” and “pride” that infiltrated the messages of the dissenters.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Poverty rate</th>
<th>Population under 18 years</th>
<th>Unemployment rate</th>
<th>GDP growth</th>
<th>GDP per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>65.4%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>4,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>4,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>5,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>5,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>8,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>8,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>18,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>23,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>50.8%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>22,850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Economic Unemployment Recorded

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Data, 2010

Demonstrators in Egypt were also grieving the absence of standards and the laziness of their regime on the international field. From being seen as the impressive pioneer of a free Arab world under Nasser, Egypt under Mubarak had transformed into “America’s poodle”, not able to make autonomous choices.
The Arab malady

As demonstrators are rampaging from Morocco to Bahrain and brutality is inundating Libya and Yemen, it appears that there has been a strong influence from the Tunisian and Egyptian events. From numerous points of view this is obvious, given that many Middle Eastern nations are inclined to similar maladies to those that have tormented Egypt and Tunisia. Still, the Arab world is not qualified to being seen as a unitary coalition. Frameworks of government vary and not all nations have the same financial and social grievances. Few Arab nations are additionally as religiously and ethnically homogenous as Tunisia and Egypt, and some harbor long-standing secessionist developments. These variances are probably going to affect the scale and state of future rebellions throughout the area.
Table 2: Democracy index

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Data, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HDI (ranking)</th>
<th>Press freedom (rating)</th>
<th>Corruption (ranking)</th>
<th>Democracy (ranking)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the economic level, numerous nations of the Arab world have similar deficiencies to those experienced by Egypt and Tunisia. Many are low to mid-wage nations with increasing unemployment rates that have been influenced by the current economic downturn and its effect on welfares and lives. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (Democracy Index, 2016), rising sustenance costs and high purchaser value inflation have decreased expectations for everyday living, with financial challenges most strongly felt by youngsters who do not have any future economic plans. Market changes and privatization in various nations, including Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia,
have been profoundly disliked and have been rebuked by the general population for worsening the current economic disquietude, as reported by the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2016)\(^7\).

Conversely, economic conditions among the oil-creating nations are to some degree diverse. Some of them have endured economic hardship amid the financial crisis and a few of them have high unemployment rates. However, expectations for everyday living standards are for the most part higher and financial grievances, where they emerge, predominantly concern the distribution of the oil fortune. Poverty is frequently confined to large groups of migrant laborers or to certain ethnic minorities. Rising oil costs, in addition, have made it considerably easier for these nations to administer economic benefits and side-installments to suppress any challenge to their inner solidness, according to Corruption Perception Index (CPI, 2016). A few of them, including Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, have already issued monetary handouts in an offer to restrain dissidents. Nonetheless, as the cases of Libya and Bahrain have proven, economic and financial wealth does not really make a difference if certain parts of the society feel that they are denied their share of the pie or harbor different grievances. Thus, while outright levels

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\(^7\) The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is the United Nations’ global development network. Headquartered in New York City, UNDP advocates for change and connects countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life.
of poverty are critical, imbalance and the absence of opportunities matter much more. The presence of a large lower middle class that has no chance to realize its aspirations have assumed a critical role in Tunisia and Egypt’s events. This clarifies why Tunisia, a nation with one of the most reduced destitution rates in the area, was the first to rampage. With regards to the liberty shortage, some variances are likewise obvious. Although free elections remain a dream throughout the area, there are contrasts in the nature of open organization, media flexibility. Nations like Jordan and Morocco, for instance, can brag impressively higher appraisals in democracy surveys than some of their neighbors. Both arrange moderately open parliamentary elections and permit the engagement of some opposition and Islamist parties, however discriminate against others. Similarly, the pace of advancement has varied. While a few, such as Bahrain and Kuwait, have expanded the space for democratic engagement and embraced reform plans, others, such as Egypt under Mubarak, have moved backwards against change or, as Saudi Arabia, have made no endeavor to open up by any means.

On the other hand, levels of open organization in Bahrain and Jordan are far from those in different parts of the Arab world. Liberty of the press has shifted generally, with Egypt standing out as one of the most open media environments in the Arab world, while Tunisia used to rank amongst the most prohibitive. Web-based social networking instruments such as Facebook and Twitter organize and scatter messages. Once started, quiet
protests immediately snowballed, attracting other social strata by combining around the straightforward message that “the people want to topple the system”. Under the weight of unprecedented mass protests, divisions in both regimes increased, resulting in the overthrow of the occupant authority by the military. While the ultimate result of both unrests still remains dubious, a political move towards a more open and fair framework now is by all accounts in progress, according to the Freedom of the Press report (2016).

**Causes of the Arab Spring**

The flood of social demonstrations that invaded the Arab world during 2011, toppling some long-standing governments and truly destabilizing others, was the result of many years of abusive and dictatorial political governments, fizzled monetary structures, and socially distanced and antagonized populaces, especially the youth, according to Aissa (Aissa, 2012). It was obvious that the youth were the primary supporters of these demonstrations, and the start of the dissents was the self-immolation of a Tunisian young fellow. The suppressed young Arab, in the Arab Spring episode, Bouazizi, was initially shown as an “unemployed college graduate”, an expression that underscored the sentiments of mortification, loss of societal position and, inequity of the baffled unemployed youth of the MENA, according to Bennani-Chraïbi and Fillieule (Bennani-Chraïbi & Fillieule, 2012). In a way, Bouazizi represents the typical civilian of the MENA nations who was disappointed – by political abuse linked to governmental and
to monetary issues— and who could not persistently accept the “mortification” of not belonging to the free democratic lifestyle.

Examining these elements in Tunisia and Egypt uncovered the aforementioned realities. First of all, the structure of the state is practically comparable as far as the development of the state in the period that followed colonialism. Both nations witnessed the development of state contraption and a firmly controlled way of life. This basic component molded these nations on the social, monetary, and political levels. However, there are a few contrasts in the two structures ever since their initiation and as time passed by. Second, with respect to the financial element, Tunisia and Egypt both had broad state control of the economy and their economic frameworks experienced distinctive stages beginning from the closed centralized economy to a more open one, then to joining the world economy, and they wound up experiencing troubles and the consequences of adjustment strategies.

In all cases, Tunisia was in a better condition than Egypt because of various approaches and distinctive state interests. For instance, Egypt’s unemployment rate was 17% while Tunisia’s was 14% (The Guardian, 2011). Ben Ali’s government tackled the economy more adequately than other nations because of a moderately stable political life during his leadership. Egypt was experiencing a political crisis and an unsteady cycle because of the instability of its politics going from one president to another. Therefore, Tunisia was moderately in a better position to manage its economy than Egypt in the period that followed the upheaval.
On the social level, both nations had a solid civil society that incorporates a huge number of associations in various fields. Human rights advocates, women, liberty of expression fighter, in addition to labors’ syndicates were effectively involved in social issues. In any case, these associations were put under strict supervision and exaggerated limitations, and sometimes faced bans and their activists were detained. Tunisian civil society was definitely more dynamic and more sophisticated as for professional association and actual worry about socio-economic issues, which at last empowered the disappointed middle class to create a core of resentment and resistance to the Ben Ali government according to Aissa (Aissa, 2012).

The Tunisian political structure is not quite the same as the Egyptian one in a few respects. First, the Tunisian political structure was established by Bourguiba (Hopwood, 1992) who, despite being a strict ruler, was a civilian president. The Egyptian political structure on the opposite of the spectrum was set by General Nasser, who was a military general and who came to disdain civilian interference in the rule of the country. Second, Tunisian political issues were moderately steady when contrasted with Egypt’s, while Egypt had a long history of crises which made political life a great deal more troublesome. Tunisian bureaucracy and political issues and organizations are moderately powerful and are have a good ranking among different states in the area. The last and definitive component is the function of the military. This component is extremely critical in preserving the structure
and the survival of the state in both quiet and chaotic circumstances. The structure of the Tunisian military is on a very basic level not the same as the Egyptian one. It was isolated from politics in the post-independence period, and it did not take part in any social or financial movements in the nation. It was kept small and was for the most part busy with helpful activities. The Egyptian military in contrast played a critical and all-infesting role in all parts of Egyptian life. It was the shadow of the government and each of the three presidents was a military commander. Additionally, it was involved in economic actions, as it possesses 40% of the Egyptian economy, which makes it a realm of finances and a self-intrigued establishment that lived at the cost of the welfare of society. Moreover, it was extended and frequently provided new weapons that were utilized to quiet any challenges to the nation’s authority.

Consequently, both militaries were constrained to take a position when demonstrations in both countries became large. The Tunisian military did not wish to keep Ben Ali in power and refused to execute his requests to take action against the dissenters; it was basically a professional force accomplishing its duty, and it effectively refused to get involved in any activity before and after the upheaval. The Egyptian military however figured out how to save its halo as the saint of the country, shielding the general population from the despot Mubarak and supervising a quiet transition, then rescuing the country again when the Muslim Brotherhood was released from power. Its
unlimited economic property was kept unscathed and its basic role in controlling Egyptian political issues was reinforced. In this manner, we see that Tunisian uprising wound up calmly and now the move is very much appreciated as one without a component of military control. In Egypt, things have turned out altogether different, with a definitive resumption of military power under Sisi's rule, directing the boundless business realm of the military foundation, while heartlessly clamping down on any types of dissent as a routine discipline to remind Egyptians never to fluctuate from the norm again. Egypt is basically represented by a board of trustees of military leaders, and there was never any genuine possibility of choosing a truly competent regular citizen for the position of President to change the power framework in the nation (Friedman, 2011).

Based on these findings, it seems that the Arab Spring was created by these variables and also influenced by them. A rather prosperous transition in Tunisia toward another political regime was conceivable because of its structure. The military is the most imperative component in achieving the transition: No organization matters more to a state’s survival than its military and no revolt inside a state can prevail without the support or the passive consent of its military, according to Barany (2013). This is surely the case in both Tunisia and Egypt, with their diverse results. So, one might ask if the Arab Spring that occurred in Tunisia is the same one Egypt has witnessed, and the answer would definitely be no (Barany, 2013).
Finally, it seems that the socio-economic components and political structures in Tunisia and Egypt were comparable, with slight differences between the two cases. These distinctions reflect the fact that the MENA area is not a homogenous unit. Thus, the “Arab Spring” is not a correct term to qualify the uprisings in the area, as various nations have distinctive socio-economic structures. It is indeed an umbrella term used to simplify a complicated and multifaceted area.

**Examination of the Usefulness of the “Arab Spring” Concept in Understanding the Recent Uprising**

The idea of “Spring” has been utilized before in various parts of the world alluding to various types of rebellions, but it was actually a European idea, which may create contempt towards the expression itself among individuals in the MENA area, whose liberty has been held back by Western authorities. The meaning of the failed “Prague Spring” likewise proposes that the Western media pessimistically expected that no enduring change would emerge from the protests in the MENA area. But Arab events ought to be named by social researchers according to the setting of the MENA area and its history, and the name ought to have something to do with Arabs themselves; they should not just qualify the MENA uprisings using an indistinguishable heading from political events in European settings. It would be preferable to call them upheavals, revolts, or revolutions and so on, as opposed to solely adopting the term the “Arab Spring”.

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A comparable perspective was exhibited by Alhassen (2012), a scholar in American Studies and Ethnicity, when she characterized the Arab Spring as an unfilled term which was not sufficiently expressive to catch what occurred in the nations or in the area; she likewise stated that “it is incorrect according to seasons too” (the significant incidents in Tunisia and Egypt happened over December 2010 to February 2011, in winter), hence it must be replaced by an allegorical scheme indicating “time of renewal” (page 412), according to Alhassen (Alhassen, 2012).

There are many reasons to dismiss the idea of the “Arab Spring”, mainly because it was not fundamentally used by the population who planned, drove, and partook in the events, or by its rivals inside the MENA. It was rather a piece of a scientific classification contrived by Western authors and media observers. Given that is it on a very basic level a Western projection onto a MENA setting, Alhassen (2012) inquired where this deficient, albeit universal expression started. She considered it deluding in light of the fact that it did not give a real recognition to the general population who carried out the rebellions and challenged their authoritarian regimes. Moreover, she went to the MENA region and met people there and asked them what they call the events in their country and in the whole region. The outcomes included many answers, but the prevailing one was thawra, signifying “revolution” in Arabic. Another common name by voters was Thawrat al Karama
(the “Revolution of Dignity”; Alhassen, 2012). Pride was unquestionably the right people were claiming, a word which buried their grievances, such as unemployment, decay, inflation and violations of human rights; they felt insulted and mortified under the authoritarian rule and believed that the time had arrived to stop this abuse and live as respectable people in countries that secured them. Another chosen name was Intifada (uprising), which has been utilized to characterize a set of rebellions in the Arab world, most clearly the Palestinian resistance, according to Guzansky and Heller (Guzansky & Heller, 2012).

**Is the Arab Spring a Revolt or Revolution?**

After clarifying diverse speculations about revolution, and the qualities of and reasons behind revolutions, the study now assesses whether these attributes warrant the Arab Spring being viewed as a revolution or a revolt. Actually, three principal components define a revolution: mass social development, the presence of progress or change, and the utilization of violence. The first component can be applied to the social movement in the Arabic world, as millions of individuals took part and invaded streets requesting change or the ousting of the tyrants. However, there is a huge debate about whether this has led to radical change or to a slight alteration of governors with the same system unaltered.

In spite of the fact that Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt resigned, the nature of the regimes in those nations has not really
changed; the tyrants left, but the autocracies remained. So, the changes that numerous demonstrators demanded were not achieved. Moreover, one must note that those requests were not actually politicized; but they were rather centered on ousting the tyrants and not their regimes or ruling systems. This mirrors the personality worship of chiefs in authoritarian regimes, especially in the MENA, where the national veneration (and dutifulness) is centered on the President or King; and so when the population is against the regime, there is just the chief to be against. This implies that the distraction of the Arab Spring developments with stigmatizing the culpable despots and (to a lesser degree) their governments empowered the political and social structures that maintain dictatorships and keep them protected, most clearly the military foundation in Egypt, which has shown that it can supersede the tiny privileges of popular democracy and remain the most influential decision maker (Tziarras, 2011).

Concerning the third element of revolution that is the utilization of violence, in Tunisia demonstrations were huge yet calm, while in Egypt, the use of violence was more articulated. The military ended up plainly partitioned into supporters and rivals of the uprising, with Egyptian officers battling each other. Be that as it may, the military high command for the most part remained apparently backing up the status quo, pending different requests from the U.S., which had financed the Egyptian military foundation since the changes of Sadat in the 1970s as a component of its endeavors to advance peace with Israel (Tziarras, 2011). Also,
Deutsch (1964) suggested that the level of mass activation, the span of an upheaval, and the number of dead people (both from the military and civilians) during the events might be used to describe a revolution (Deutsch, 1964). The majority of these uprisings in the MENA area went on moderately for a brief timeframe, with the eminent exception of Syria, and the number of victims was too low to make the events revolutions according to Tziarras (Tziarras, 2011).

So, a revolution should in any event concentrate on political and social changes (if not financial and religious/ideological); from this perspective, the Arab Spring developments in Arab nations have not achieved the phase of being a revolution, since they have realized constrained rewards as in the Gulf nations, ungainly coalitions as in Tunisia, or counter-revolutionary reactionary strategies and regimes arrangements as in Egypt. With no lucid revolutionary strategies or requests, the Arab Spring trademarks definitely brought about no political modernization or individual liberties, but instead a fleeting shake-up of the current power structures.
Analysis of the Role of Socioeconomics and Political structures in the Arab Spring

Much literature, many books, articles and reports have discussed whether the idea of foreign assistance is effective or not, but mainly from an economical perspective. However, foreign aid can affect many other aspects of nations’ growth, notably in their political and socioeconomic structures. This book has discussed the political structures of Arab Spring nations that includes the importance of the MENA region for other countries; the role of the Sunnis and Shias in the Arab Spring; the political side effect of the Arab Spring; the Arab Spring and democracy; the Arab Spring and civil war; and Arab Spring and ineffective Aids. It also has discussed the socioeconomic analysis effects of the Arab Spring that includes the government responses to the challenge; the main characteristics of the Arab bad socioeconomic growth model; and the log-term expected consequences. And it ends with a conclusion that sum up all the discussed points.

Political Structures of Arab Spring nations

The Arab Spring that started and spread throughout the Arab world was in fact a series of uprisings demanding changes in political systems in different Arab countries. The nations of the Middles East were suffering from economic and social injustices, yet lacked a clear political perspective. Drawing conclusions about the outcome of the Arab Spring in the Middle East is premature; however the track of events by the end of 2012 shows
political change in more than one nation, and concessions and limited reforms in others. It also points to an expansion in Islamic tendencies, divergent inclinations in political bodies and a decline in economic circumstances. The Arab nations are therefore still trying to cope with modernization while a regional malaise has resulted from the uprisings in the Middle East (Owen, 2012)

Why is the MENA Region so Important for Other Countries?
The MENA region has constantly interested great powers because of its important location, bearing vital conduits and lodging divine sites for three major religions (Islam, Christianity, and Judaism). The MENA area has 54% of the world’s oil and natural gas assets. Natural gas is passed on from North African nations to Europe through ships and pipelines. Many nations have urgent national interests in the MENA area (Desai, 2012). European Union (EU)\(^8\) countries tend to decrease their reliance on Russian gas by moving the assets from the MENA region into Europe. Also, being old colonies of European states, the MENA nations\(^9\) still rely on European developed technology and

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\(^8\) The European Union is a political and economic union of 28 member states that are located primarily in Europe. It has an area of 4,475,757 km\(^2\), and an estimated population of over 510 million. When European countries started to cooperate economically in 1951, only Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands participated. Over time, more and more countries decided to join. The Union reached its current size of 28 member countries with the accession of Croatia on 1 July 2013.

\(^9\) The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a region encompassing approximately 22 countries in the Middle East and North Africa. The MENA region accounts for approximately 6% of the world’s population, 60% of the world’s oil reserves and 45% of the world’s natural gas reserves. Due to the region’s substantial petroleum and natural gas reserves, MENA is an important source of global economic stability.
industrial goods. Likewise, migration from African nations, principally through and from Libya, into Europe constrained Italy and other European states to take precautions. In this regard, what occurs in this region is of incredible importance to EU nations.

The U.S.’s way of dealing with the MENA nations is dictated by security concerns and vital interests. Following the 9/11 assaults, the relations between the West and the MENA nations have become more troublesome and they have been thought to be a space for terrorist activities, as was noted by Dorsey (Dorsey, 2011). Additionally, oil collected in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait is of great significance for U.S. And according to Howard (2012), Syria gets most of its arms from Russia, which is its most important ally. Russian military interests in Syria have come to up to 26 billion dollars lately (Howard, 2012). Just in 2010, 15 billion dollar arms deals were signed between the two nations as reported by Colombo (2012). Also, Syria has great significance for Russia, which has wanted to get access to warm oceans all through its history. Russia is aiming at improving its indispensable Tartus Naval Base\(^\text{10}\) for greater warships, which has existed since 1971 in Syria. The upkeep and improvement of the base is of important significance for Russia as far as its national interests and impact on the Arab world and its influence in the Eastern

\(^{10}\) The Russian naval facility in Tartus is a leased military installation of the Russian Navy located in the port of the city of Tartus, Syria. Russian official usage classifies the installation as a Material-Technical Support Point and not a "base".
Mediterranean depend on it. In this regard, Russia remains the real backer of the Syrian regime. Since the UN\textsuperscript{11}, the NATO\textsuperscript{12} and the Organization of Islamic Conference cannot reach an accord and the conduct of two territorial forces, Turkey and Iran, contrast, Russia is probably going to maintain its present Syrian strategy.

China backs the Syrian regime against opposition activities that may represent a danger for its vital security and material supply. Iran, which considers the events in the area as a danger, bolsters dictatorial regimes as a precautionary measure. Iran was against the NATO interference in Libya in March 2011 for fear that the same kind of move would be made against Syria, as stated by Owen (Owen, 2012).

Turkey has cultural and historical ties with MENA nations since the Ottoman Empire. And as a result of the 2008 global economic crisis, Turkey, whose food proportions declined fundamentally to U.S. and EU nations, made its exporters scan for new markets. Subsequently, MENA nations have turned out to be significant options.

Contentions about democratization in the Arab world and the MENA area have been a subject of open deliberation among researchers. In the light of this situation, this section examines the

\textsuperscript{11} The United Nations is an intergovernmental organization tasked to promote international co-operation and to create and maintain international order.
\textsuperscript{12} The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, also called the North Atlantic Alliance, is an intergovernmental military alliance between several North American and European states based on the North Atlantic Treaty that was signed on 4 April 1949.
ideas of “democracy” and the “procedure of democratization” proclaimed by some in the field. This can offer a strong base for any criticism that has been stated of the U.S. model of democratization. This section on the Political Impacts of the Arab Spring examines the ideas of “democracy” and “democratization”. Meanwhile, questions of compatibility between the culture of the region and democracy will be tackled too, with a special emphasis on history and religion, and their importance in the region, and whether the model of democratization catches the financial and political elements of the current uprisings in the region and especially in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Libya.

The role of the Sunnis and Shias in the Spring Arab

A- Background of Sunnis and Shias:

Two important divisions in Islam, Sunnis and Shias, have lived throughout history without showing direct hate to each other even though there were different beliefs between the two sects about religious views and the succession of the prophet Mohammad. The root of this conflict occurred a long time ago, and has been a point of contention in many Middle Eastern countries as each sect strives to realize higher ambitions. A new issue started to separate Shias and Sunnis after the appearance of some of their political differences. According to Aboultaif (2011), the rise of the tension between the two groups started after the rise of the Islamic republic of Iran in 1979 and with the celebration of “Ashura”, which reshaped the new identity of Shias (Aboultaif,
Following the original disagreement between Sunnis and Shias on who should govern Muslim communities, the Shias assigned imams as a plan to take control of the Muslim world and bring back justice to Palestine (Pew research center, 2011). On the other hand, Saudis, having observed these events in Iran, refused to give the right to govern to Shias (Aboultaif, 2011) and notably suppressed the public procession of Ashura on their territories Pew Research Center (2011). Other activities were arranged against Al Saud to take away the authority from the Saudi royal family. Consequently, Imam Khomeini started to appoint “wakils” (sponsors) in countries with strong Shia presence such as Kuwait, Bahrein, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and Lebanon, to counter the power of Saudi Sunnis (Aboultaif, 2011).

**B-History:**

Even though Sunnis and Shias are both Muslims, they do have a historical conflict starting exactly after the death of the Prophet Mohamed in 632. This was the beginning of the conflict since the Shias refused the idea of giving up the leadership following the death of the prophet to his best friend -Abu Baker- and wanted it instead to be given to Ali who was a relative and a descendant of the family through his daughter and kinsman. In 656, Ali – Fatima’s husband- was appointed only for a short period of time before he was assassinated in 661 after a disagreement with Mouawiya, who was denied governance later on by Shias who believed that the successor should be one of the family members. However, the end Hussein’s life -Ali and Fatima’s son – who was
killed by the son of Mouawiya -Yazid- to show vengeance for his father's death marked the beginning of “Shiism” as named by Kamaly (1980) in one of his dialogues. The Abbasid and Omawiyin tried to invade the Shiite lands till the end of 1258, and that helped in the appearance of the Ismailia’s, Zaidies and the concept of having a hereditary Sunni succession (Pew research center, 2011). The first appearance of Shias’ descendants as governors was in Egypt and in North of Africa where they were known as the Ismailia in 969. Then they extended the Fatimid Dynasty to the south of the Arabic peninsula. Some of them were able to reach Yemen, Syria, Iran, and South India. However, their original plan was to abolish the Abbasid government. Another appearance of the Shias was the Sufawis Dynasty in Farris, Iraq, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and some of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey in 1501. It was spread by force, and the power of religious Shias subsequently started to grow in Iran. The Ottoman Empire that was dominant in Turkey and that was constituted of descendants of the Sunnis drew the geographical limits seen today, whereby the Shias stayed in Iraq and the Sunnis in Turkey, which made those two divisions largely internally homogeneous in terms of sect distribution (Pew research center, 2011).

Other issues emerged as subjects of conflict, such as whether the imam’s perfection is comparable to that of the prophet’s, bad
intention towards Aisha\textsuperscript{13}, the procedure of Ashura\textsuperscript{14}, marrying for fun (\textit{muta’a}?)\textsuperscript{13}, and other issues (Pew research center, 2011).

**C-The Demography of Sunnis and Shias:**

A study conducted in 2011 by the Pew Research Center (2011), estimated that the number of Muslims Sunnis will surpass the number of Shias in 2030. The 2 Billion Sunnis are expected to make up 87-90\% of the Muslim world, which is not significantly different from the situation today. The Shias will be unable to reach the population of Muslim Sunnis. Therefore, Shias are and will continue to be the minority globally, except in Iran, Bahrain, Azerbaijan, Iraq, and in the southern part of Lebanon and in large areas in Pakistan and India. Thus, the story is different in Egypt, Indonesia, Turkey, and Bangladesh, where the majorities are Sunnis (Pew research center, 2011).

**D- Players:**

There is no doubt that there are two direct sides fostering the conflicts between Sunnis and Shias and creating other groups to help maintain these contentions and switch the power differential from one group to the other. The Sunnis found sub-players to help them defend their rights and save them from the hate of their rivals. Wahhabis are one group of protectors of Sunnis who moved politically to defend them in Saudi Arabia and got involved

\textsuperscript{13} how her husband should reprimand her, making sure that he keeps a just balance – between angry outbursts that hurt her feelings, – and shying away from saying anything to her out of fear of confrontation or a desire to evade responsibility.

\textsuperscript{14} The steps followed to celebrate the Ashura in some Islamic countries such as Iran.
in all aspects of their livelihood. They did not stop there however; they continued the expansion of their influence in other locations where Sunnis are dominant. In contrast, the Shias represented by The Shah in Iran were worried about their rivals’ progression and wanted to work hand by hand with other Shias in the Arab world (Pew research center, 2011).

**Political Side effect for Spring Arab**

The Arab Spring that started in Tunisia as a revolution and put the president in a position to leave his country was the inspiration of similar revolutions across the Middle East. This revolution that started on the 17th of December 2010 with Mohamed Bouazizi\(^\text{15}\) was opening all locked doors to Tunisians. The poor citizen set himself on fire after being humiliated by a police officer when he refused to pay bribes. Subsequently, more Tunisians started to join protests, refusing the dictatorial regime’s suppression.

The Arab Spring was constituted by several simultaneous political protesting movements. It was first such instance in the history of Arab people. Many joined to defend concepts that had existed in dictionaries but were never experienced, such as liberty, democracy, fairness, dignity, and courage. From here, it is interesting to look for the influence of the new Arab Spring on political education in the Arab world. Post-Arab Spring citizens

\(^{15}\)Tarek el-Tayeb *Mohamed Bouazizi* (Arabic: محمد البوعزيزي; 29 March 1984 – 4 January 2011) was a Tunisian street vendor who set himself on fire on 17 December 2010, in response to the confiscation of his wares and the harassment and humiliation that he said was inflicted on him by a municipal official and her aides.
were able to draft new laws with the new changes and they started searching for their role in creating those new laws and structures (Pew research center, 2011).

The conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia intensified, because each of the two countries was looking to dominate most of the Arab world. They knew the importance of their dominance of other Arab nations, especially that of Bahrain, which represents a historical location of geopolitical competition. It was claimed by Iran after the departure of the British, and that was not accepted by Saudi Arabia. Later on, the Shah recommended that Bahrain could decide its own destiny and take over its own sovereignty. Saudi Arabia did not want to give up its power and ignore the role previously played by Iran.

In Syria, the protests grew rapidly after one year of the Tunisian Revolution. These protests took place mostly around mosques, which gave the chance for religious figures to play their own role in shaping them for their own interests. Raising their voice against the government that had been taken over hundreds of years prior by the Alawites was a chance for Sunnis to demand their rights. The Alawites were a very underprivileged sect until Hafez Al Assad took office and systematically raised their status, by giving assigning them the most prestigious job opportunities in the country and leaving the Sunnis deprived from such positions. Even though the Sunni population exceeded the Alawites, the governmental seats closest to Assad were consistently reserved
for Alawites. The sect was also given political and security-related power, and Alawites were working closely with those from the highest socioeconomic classes of Damascus and Aleppo (Pew research center, 2011).

Historically, Alawites separated from the Shias after years of keeping some connections with them, and favoring Ali’s teachings; which is why the name “Alawites” came to be. Their teachings are significantly different from those of Sunnis. For example, the five prayers are only considered a symbolic practice for them, while they are considered an obligation in the Sunni teachings of Islam. Alawites also have some secret beliefs that they do not reveal to those outside their sect.

These different groups have been unable to find a peaceful end since 1979, with the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini, the war between Iraq and Iran in 1980, the Gulf war following Iraq’s intervention in Kuwait in 1990, and the attack of the west on Iraq in 2003. The Arab Spring protests have also influenced their relations post-2011, and the appearance of Islamic terrorist attacks played a negative role too, and the war in Syria which is still ongoing till this day. The support of each sectarian authority to its people, such as providing financial and ideological support, has been a major factor contributing to the continuation of the tension. The suicide attacks of extremists such as Salafis against Shias in many different countries where they exist did not keep any space for reconciliation. In the U.K. for example, the Wahhabis are blamed
for this conflict by the Shias, especially after the 2013 demonstration during which Ahmad Chaudhry\textsuperscript{16} claimed that Shiites are the enemies of God. Simultaneously, Shias felt unwelcome in Sunni mosques, and started student societies in different parts of Britain. Also, the wars in Iraq and Syria, as previously stated, were perfect occasions to increase the tension between the two groups (Pew research center, 2011).

Syria’s civil uprising was a perfect proxy for the two sects to play their role to out-power each other. In the beginning of 2012, the Shias from Iran and their affiliated Lebanese militia “Hezbollah” were the first helping hand of Bashar Al Assad and the Alawites, adding fuel to the war that was taking place in Syria. The attempt at empowering the republic of Iran followed by Shiites, and the weakening of the Sunnis found another chance in Syria, which also lead to the appearance of more extremists

**The Arab Spring and Democracy**

After the initiation of the Arab Spring (2011-2013), numerous scholars stated that it denoted a huge change in international affairs, and the major worldwide pattern that had been established since the end of the Cold War: the Arab Spring portrays the most important series of political-economic movements since the fall of communism in Europe (Desai, 2012). Indeed, even in the Arab

\textsuperscript{16}Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry is a Pakistani diplomat who serves as the Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States. Previously, he served as the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, as the Pakistan's Ambassador to the Netherlands and the spokesperson of the Foreign Office.
world, there was a sort of hope joined to the expectation that the events were something beyond a simple “democratic growth”, but rather a revolutionary request for acknowledging people’s entitlement to human pride, according to Alhassen (Alhassen, 2012).

Amidst worsening “decay, torment, inequality, disparity and no liberty” (page 85), somebody needed to stand up and say “that’s it” (Amin, 2013). It appeared to many as another daybreak following quite a lengthy period of restraint and fierceness by long-ruling regimes; the Arabs had made the first and urgent move toward democracy and liberty (Pew research center, 2011).

Despite the strength of individuals all through the MENA region who took a chance with their lives by invading the streets to demand the fall of their despots and liberty for their nations, they possessed no power in comparison to the governments they were facing. According to Friedman (2011), many experts believed that no real change would take place as long as the old regimes stayed in power, even if there was a change in individuals ruling the country (Friedman, 2011). It was believed that the Arab world and its populations lacked the basic components of democracy, and consequently democracy could not be applicable in this region of the world. These components are: civil society, economic growth, a middle class, establishments, social activation, political culture, and closeness to a good example of democracy as per Howard (Howard, 2012).
Accordingly, the “Spring” occurrence only denotes the beginning of a democratic shift in the Arab world, in which the targets are mainly focused on social equity, human rights, and economic growth (Trabelsi, 2013).

To test whether the Arab Spring will eventually lead to the implementation of democracy in the MENA, one must first define what a transition is and apply its standards to the upheaval.

A transition is the interim between one political government and another. Transitions are demarcated on one hand by the starting of the procedure of disintegration of a dictator’s rule, and on the other by the establishment of some type of democracy, the return to some type of tyranny, or the development of a revolutionary option according to O'Donnell and Schmitter (cited in (Mainwaring, 1989)). This definition emphasizes the procedure and the anticipated advancement. A transition procedure might possibly prompt democracy, and it might or might not prompt steadiness. Another definition expresses that democratic transition “is a political procedure known by a modern development from one governance structure to another, able to implement the essential democratic basics” (page 253), according to Trabelsi (Trabelsi, 2013). Utilizing these definitions will help examine the Arab Spring uprisings as a transitional move from one structure to another.

The category of the transition will be examined in this study. This uprising required the fall of dictatorships in nations like Tunisia,
Egypt, Syria, and Libya and effectively denoted the start of transitional procedures. As the history of democracy and transition reveals, there are a few standards of transition that characterize the process. To start with, a transition does not happen all of a sudden and does not generally end with common outcomes (Aydinli, 2013). Based on the definition, there are a few potential outcomes that can occur as a result of the process. The history of democracy in Europe demonstrates that transition takes quite a while, as the West required a century and half to witness the aftermath of a long and brutal transition as noted by Berman (Berman, 2007). Besides, revolt requires some time, and liberty is costly, according to Ramadan (Ramadan, 2011a).

Moreover, the transition procedure is generally characterized with brutality and disorder, and the history of democracies has been loaded with turmoil, struggle, and even brutality (Berman, 2007). Likewise, it confronts difficulties and adversaries, according to Aydinli (Aydinli, 2013). The American and French revolutions demonstrated that brutality is usually vital to change political regimes. Old regimes normally oppose any demand for change and defend their positions. This will usually lead to brutal clashes, and even civil wars. Challenges that confront the process of transition can be financial conditions and rivalry between various progressive groups over the authority of the new system. Moreover, the shift toward democracy is loaded with ambiguity according to Stepan and Linz (Stepan & Linz, 2013). This is also clear in the previously mentioned definition, in which the eventual
fate of the transitional procedure can prompt the securement of democracy, or it can prompt the comeback of dictatorship, or it can break out a big revolution.

Let us check if these criteria apply to the Arab Spring. With respect to the principal criterion, the uprisings started four years ago with the revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria, and no one can anticipate where these nations are heading. In addition, even before the uprising, populations had called for change through modest demonstrations and through a few literature and media productions.

As far as the second criterion is concerned, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Libya have encountered some brutal episodes amid the uprisings and the period that followed. Egypt has witnessed a massacre under the military clampdown following Sisi’s coup against the chosen president. That was no genuine upheaval, thus there was no genuine counterrevolution, rather a reassertion of the hidden regime's authority. The instance of Tunisia was less fierce than that of Egypt, and it has figured out how to experience a generally tranquil move to the present; however one must wait to see what will eventually rise up out of the hot pot of communism, patriotism, secularism, and Islamism (Aydinli, 2013).

Difficulties and foes then again are what transition needs to confront in the short run. The financial conditions are the foundation of each political improvement. As the uprisings were in part due to terrible economic conditions, better conditions can be
required to fuel the steadiness of a new political regime. Subsequently, the absence of economic prosperity can be an obstruction to democracy, and even if democracy is established, the economic conditions won’t change quickly and won’t resolve the issues of the population for the time being, and thus people will be very disappointed according to Sorenson (Sorenson, 2011). It is the economy and prosperity that the Arab Spring nations need to manage so as to move toward democracy. The other test is the opposition between various revolutionary groups over authority. Egypt for instance is confronting tough and complex circumstances.

The brutal conflicts between adversaries and supporters of President Morsi resulted in casualties and deaths. Likewise, the expanding turmoil and disarray and rivalry amongst Islamists and secularists, and the shadowy yet definitive part of the military alongside immediate and indirect foreign interference all consolidated the hindering of the endeavors of the Arab Spring development to establish democracy and order according to Ramadan (Ramadan, 2013). Tunisia has genuine rivalry amongst Islamists and secularists, yet through more civil methods like campaigns and elections, which interferes partition in society based on national and religious differences.

The third criterion is the instability of the transition’s future, which is the case of the Arab Spring nations. Four long years of uprisings and brutality and disorder have not brought about any
evident vision. A more tyrannical military junta manages Egypt and demonstrations are fiercely repressed in various areas of the country. The economy is as yet disintegrating, under a flimsy political process. Tunisia is the same, despite the fact that it is less brutal; however observers are as yet worried that things may deteriorate. Finally, multiple nations are placed under the category between dictatorship and democracy, which is a transitional procedure according to the Democratization Journal issued in 2013.

So, the transitional procedure is hard and can bring about conflicts and clashes into nations. In any case, if countries deal with the hindrances and the tumult with tolerance and consciousness of the dangers, then they can diminish this unsafe, troublesome process. There are some prescribed steps to follow in order to prevent conditions from deteriorating. The initial step is to have a “security belt” in the transitional period. This implies dealing with the disordered situation with repressive means, which can be viewed as a fundamental but brief impediment of democracy. The second step is to have arrangement and dealing processes between the distinctive parts of the political elite, including the old regime elite, according to the Democratization Journal issued in 2013.

The third step is to develop equilibrium between religious (or ideological) values and democratic values. Religion and political issues should not be mixed if a democracy is to emerge. Islamic
parties and groups should not blindly adhere to their ideological plans and they ought to be pliable in the negotiation procedure, while secular groups ought to recognize people’s beliefs and cultural legacies, with all opinions being respected. Civil state and civil society must have this sort of equilibrium between religion and governmental issues, such as the examples of Turkey and Malaysia that have embraced religion and democracy in an advanced state style. In any case, if Arab nations can create balance between democracy and religion, political transition will be valuable for introducing democracy according to Trabelsi (Trabelsi, 2013).

Adopting those steps and applying them in cases like Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Libya will give a reasonable image of the transitional procedure in the four nations. Beginning with the initial step of having a security belt, the military powers in Egypt had an expanded role compared to a traditional state, yet they did not defend dissenters and did not create a fertile environment for change to happen. Conversely, they utilized their weapons to hunt down opposition to the old regime; hence the transitional procedure of Egypt is still in mayhem, if not a lasting return to dictatorship. Then again, Tunisian military forces were not engaged in the political move. They secured the dissenters and continued securing the state from any inner clash.

The second step consists of not excluding any party. Egypt, after the resignation of Mubarak, experienced a tense episode between
Islamic groups, old regime parties, and the military. This pressure brought about the overthrow of the elected Islamic government and led to excluding the Muslim Brotherhood from any engagement in political activities. In that way, Egypt was unable to establish a calm transition. Be that as it may, Tunisian political groups have all taken an interest in a coalition government where nobody was barred. This is the reason it has come further than Egypt in its move toward democracy.

The last step for a prosperous transition is to establish equilibrium between religious and democratic values. This progression is elusive in Egypt because of various Islamic parties, each with various translations of Islam and dreams of political Islamism with different views regarding the compatibility between Islam and democracy. Additionally, Islamic parties in Egypt have an ideological foundation which common individuals and the adolescent regularly fear. In Tunisia, Islamic parties have come to share more with the Turkish model of democracy, which separates religion from politics.

With everything taken into account, as indicated by the transitional criteria, Tunisia is far closer than Egypt in its transition to democracy. Tunisia has a past filled with democratic standards compared to other Arab countries; for example, in 2012 it got a
score of 3 out of 7 for political rights in the Freedom House\textsuperscript{17} scale as noted by Stepan and Linz (Stepan & Linz, 2013). Additionally, in Tunisia, secularism implies a civil state as opposed to an antireligious one. Moreover, in Tunisia, citizens trust that a democratic regime is satisfactory as well as vital and this encourages the bartering procedure between Islamists and mainstream liberals. Additionally Islamists and liberals do not fear each other's plans since Tunisia has internal peace. Notwithstanding that, Tunisia has a more progressed political society than Egypt, which is useful in the transitional procedure on the grounds that civil society can assume a part in the pulverization of the dictatorships, but building a democratic political society is required too, according to Stepan and Linz (Stepan & Linz, 2013). Additionally, the test for the future in MENA in general is to establish a great equilibrium between Islamic religious and democratic values. Tunisia has all that it takes to present this model according to Masmoudi (Masmoudi, 2011).

**The Arab Spring and Civil wars**

Undoubtedly, many nations in the post-cold war world are shifting towards democratization, but the whip of civil wars has not dwindled. Civil wars are not only still happening, they have also surpassed wars between states, and today there are various

\textsuperscript{17} Freedom House is a U.S.-based 501 U.S. Government-funded non-governmental organization that conducts research and advocacy on democracy, political freedom, and human rights. Freedom House was founded in October 1941.
conflicts that have effectively mutated into civil wars or are soon going to.

In spite of this process of a macro political move through the entire MENA region, the Arab Monarchies together with some presidential dictatorships have effectively prevented regime change, because of their expansive use of restraint, cooptation, directed changes, and welfare services among their populaces. In fact, Yemen, Syria, and Libya are as of now encountering similar wars, in spite of the way that their governments additionally applied similar crisis management tools.

Brutal political conflicts are some of the main challenges the world is facing today (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2002), and in the post-cold war period they are progressively the result of ethno-religious cleavages added to financial grievances. This section dissects three categories of the pertinent writing on the subject.

**A- Authoritarian Political Systems**

The Large-N studies\(^{18}\) include the MENA nations as one of the numerous areas of the world with tyrant political systems and higher recurrence of conflicts Snyder (Snyder, 2000). These reviews combine research that applies existing models of upheavals and top down changes to Syria, Libya, and Yemen. This assemblage of writing also dissects the qualities of tyranny

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\(^{18}\) Logic of inference is same for qualitative and quantitative approaches, but styles of analysis are different. Qualitative research uses thick description of a small number of cases, particular events, decision, institutions, location, regime, and nation. Quantitative research uses numerical measurement abstracting.
and the way through which the sort of party system affects the chances of effective democratization (Beck & Hüser, 2012).

**B- Democratization and the risk of civil war**
The second classification of writing pertinent to the review concentrates on the relationship between the democratization and the risk of civil war or armed conflict. It is further subdivided into investigations and reports from research organizations, international associations, and scholarly articles. Some of these reviews incorporate the quantitative analysis of Hadenius and Teorell (Hadenius & Teorell, 2007), which presents proof that from a wide range of dictatorial and autocratic administrations, the ones with restricted multiparty political systems have the most noteworthy chances (0.52) to move to a solid democracy, which did not occur in Yemen. Other researchers posit a connection between the reliance on oil/gas incomes and political solidity, such as Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds (Brownlee, Masoud & Reynolds, 2013) who plainly affirm that administrations without significant oil income and non-inherited succession fall effectively. Actually, chances of a military crackdown are considered to be inversely correlated to the level of professionalization in the military. Considering a few other observational reviews likewise demonstrates that fierce responses amid the transitional phase are inversely associated with the chances of building up a solidified democracy. On the other hand, Snyder (Snyder, 2000) contends that national clashes and political brutality are profoundly likely to show up; in light of the fact that as Huntington
(1968) notes that natives raise their requests amid the transitional time frame, benefiting from their newfound use on state politics.

Also, researchers have set up the relationship amongst despotic and autocratic administrations and higher danger of civil war (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Taking after that examination, Halperin, Siegle, and Weinstein (Halperin, Siegle, & Weinstein, 2009) dissect a quarter century long period of interstate and civil war, and discover a weak link between democracy and civil battle. The absence of a solid relationship between democratization and the danger of civil war is additionally highlighted by Thompson and Tucker (Thompson & Tucker, 1997). So, the positive relationship between democratization and the onset of civil war built up by Mansfield and Snyder (Mansfield & Snyder, 2009), in contrast to the theories of avarice or grievances, is not acknowledged by much of the political science literature. Bogaards (Bogaards, 2010) for example, indicates an alternate process in which the relapse pattern does not accomplish a similar level of statistical significance. On the other hand, Vreeland (year?) demonstrates that the information from Polity IV does not demonstrate a critical relationship between political establishments and the onset of civil war.

**Arab Spring and Ineffective Aids**

Most studies suggest that assistance is ineffective, mainly due to its mismanagement. Some scholars claim that if the country’s infrastructure is weak, no matter the amount of aid it receives, the
results will turn out to be quite deceiving (Robinson, 2013). According to Fredrik Erixon (2007), aid is ineffective and it has contributed to more corruption and poverty (Patai, 2016). Erixon (2007) compared in his study the GDP growth in African countries and the amount of foreign aid they receive only to conclude that aid was never really effective and could sometimes even have a negative impact at the economic level. Erixon’s (2007) findings affirm Millet’s (2012) argument, that suggests, “aid has generally failed to achieve its stated goals” (page 302). However, this argument notes that aid is only supposed to help the economic development with no other positive benefits.

Additionally, Moyo (Moyo, 2010) agrees with them, arguing that the United States should give up its aid policy as it is increasing poverty in Africa (Boone, 2015). According to Moyo (Moyo, 2010), there is now a vicious circle whereby African countries depend on aid, and aid is either mismanaged or goes to corrupt authorities; consequently, such countries rely on more aid. Therefore, there must be another way for African countries to beat poverty.

Moreover, Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (Djankov & al, 2006) have found in a recent study that aid has “negative impact on the democratic stance of developing countries, and on economic growth by reducing investment and increasing government consumption.” (Svensson, 2012). Djankov (Djankov & al, 2006) points out that a ruler who receives “a sudden windfall of resources” (page 105) will become manipulative and will deny
people the right of making any decisions about the distribution of the received resources (Thomas, 2013).

He says that aid resources can “damage the political institutions of the receiving country by reducing checks and balances in government and democratic rules.” (Wintrobe, 2008)

On the other hand, while Svensson (2012) was studying the effectiveness of foreign aid, he claimed that the growth in the government revenue does not necessarily mean growth in public supplies; and that such government will be relying on more aid and will not be seeking potential effective policies to improve its nations standards (Tharoor, 2012). Boone (2015) also adds that aid does not benefit the poor, but only those in elite positions (Moyo, 2010). In his book “The White Man’s Burden”, William Easterly explains, “Why the West’s efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good.” (Page.85). On the other hand, Knacks (Knacks, 2003) studied the link between foreign aid and promoting democracy in developing countries and concluded that they are not correlated. Other researchers have also pointed out the effectiveness of foreign assistance on democracy; thus it is interesting to make further investigations of the topic (Savun, 2011).

During the turmoil, while riots occurred in Israel, Iran, and Turkey, whose rulers are thought to be acceptable by their people, strong popular protests occurred in countries like Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, whose governments needed authenticity. It seems that
the MENA region is going to witness some real change in its political structure. Local players seem to act freely while international and regional forces should adjust the previous policies to new conditions, according to Khandelwal and Roitman (Khandelwal & Roitman, 2013).

In Tunisia, the 23 year-long rule of Ben Ali was over in January 2011 and his political party was revoked. Annahda, the political party set up by Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia, won the October 2011 elections, getting 41.47% of the votes as per EIU (2011)\(^\text{19}\). But, it is difficult to claim that the post-revolt process is continuing appropriately. The Tunisian Government has not figured out how to accomplish much in social and economic areas.

Hosni Mubarak had to step down after the demonstrations of January 25, 2011. A new Constitution was drafted on March 19, 2011 and parliamentary elections were held on November 28, 2011. Mohammad Morsi won the presidential elections on June 2012. But, growth development rates could not be enhanced, national and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was not pulled in, thus, markets could not be balanced out. The Morsi Government could not find a way to adapt to unemployment, particularly among the youngsters, and enhance social equity. So, protests restarted on June, 30, 2013 and the Egyptian military overthrew the Morsi government on the 4\(^{\text{th}}\) of July 2013.

\(^{19}\) EIU: The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index and Report, 2011.
The protests in Libya, upheld by NATO mediation driven by France, began in February 2011 and ended when Qaddafi was killed on October 20. On the 23rd of October, the National Transition Council was built up and on July 7, 2012, free elections were held. But, conflicts between tribes are ongoing, and the solidarity of the state is jeopardized as per Masetti and Körner (2007).

In Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, anti-democratic regimes were ousted while some economic and social rights were conceded (Stepan & Linz, 2013). In Syria, the losses of lives surpassed one hundred thousand people from the beginning of the crisis till July 2013.

The Arab Spring and the conflict in Syria worsened Turkey-Iran relations. Turkey is supporting opposition activities while Iran has been supporting Assad’s regime with both military and political means (OECD, 2013).

**The Socioeconomic Analysis effects of the Arabic Spring**

To study the socioeconomic effects of the Arabic Spring and the changes that have affected the Middle East, a standpoint is needed. Even though it is difficult to separate the economic features from the political ones, this part will take care of that. One should examine the events of last year starting with the general approach to the events consecutively to understand the economic needs' variations in one area.
Both the economic and political levels experienced some vagueness, so economic systems were needed to be established. Establishing a new government and a new economic structure were the great efforts that countries had been looking for. The type of regime did not matter; whether it was capitalist, socialist, Islamist, or any other. If the political system changes, there will be a slow alteration in the economic system in the long run.

As discussed before, the appearance of the Arab revolutions was partly due to economic reflections. For many years, Arab countries suffered some economic problems influenced by more global ones. The distortion was widely spread, the income that was distributed unequally, the joblessness that was reaching the young youth, and the political freedoms that people lacked were the fuel for the uprisings against the old Arab governments.

Even though economic growth was reported in some of the Arab Spring countries before the uprising, the average Syrian, Tunisian, or Egyptian was not able to reach wealth. The economic-political leader was part of the group that benefited, since the leader controlled much of the economy. In Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Syria, and Libya, one family controlled everything. The World Bank (2011)\textsuperscript{20} classified these countries as lower middle-income nations.

\textsuperscript{20} The World Bank is an international financial institution that provides loans to countries of the world for capital programs. With 189 member countries, the World
Next, the financial situation will be presented according to a medium to long-term analysis of the Middle East. First, the similarities between nations in which a revolution has happened will be discussed, and then, the government reactions will be highlighted by taking into consideration the economic costs of the Arab spring. In addition, the long-term results will be analyzed, in regards to the Arab Spring and the rise of the Islamist parties. Besides, possible new forms of government in the Arab world such as those of Turkey and Indonesia will be examined and regarded as future example. Last, the economic effects of the Arab Spring on Israel will be anatomized too.

No one knows the right way and time for revolutionary change to occur, due to the special characteristics of every country, which are themselves responsible for the change. Increasing public spending to improve the infrastructure is a possibility for the new governments. Islamic parties will not be isolated. In conclusion, there is no doubt that it is inevitable for the country to have their own period of instability, but economic advancement in growth could come after.

The revival of tourism and job finding with new policies for the youth are mostly needed, and support of the entrepreneurship in the businesses of Arab Spring countries is crucial. With these new
policies, some positive changes may be seen in the near future (Pew research center, 2011).

The Arab Spring was affected by the main countries’ economic situation, particularly the economic circumstances that characterized each involved country before the uprising. Unemployment among young and graduated students and corruption were the realities of these countries.

Talking about economic achievements, Tunisia was a successful economic tale before 2010. Energy imports helped the country achieve a vital economic growth with time. The well-educated or graduates could not find jobs in the strong job-providing sector, which was tourism. Unemployment among university graduates was documented according to the World Bank in Tunisia at 46% after 18 months of graduation and 23% overall in 2009 (World Bank, 2010b). According to Lewis (2002), President Ali and his wife’s family, the Trabelsis, ran the political and economic sides of Tunisia, which spread practices of bribery, since 30% to 40% of the economy was controlled by them alone.

Accordingly, Tunisia witnessed a real development reaching 3.8% with an average of 5% during the ten years that preceded 2010. The process of transferring ownership and style of living grew gradually. An employment was persistent among the young and the educated, which frustrated and spread corruption and increased food prices and resulting political unrest.
The Arab spring spread to Egypt, the economy of which was not a failure. A policy of reorganization was adopted by the Egyptian government, which gave away the development of the economy and raised the investment of the other countries. Therefore, economic reforms were seen in Egypt, yet the global economic problems affected Egypt before 2008. Eight percent of the country’s GDP\(^{21}\) was increased as a lack in the budget, and it decreased to almost half in 2009 because of the exports manufacturing and tourism (OECD, 2013). Increasing in 2010, the GDP growth rose to 5.3% but did not attain the same percentage of the average reached before 2007. A big gap between the income of Egyptians and elevated levels of joblessness, which was about 24 % among youths aged 15-24 (about 60% of the total unemployed) and 16-19 % among individuals who are university graduates (as opposed 25 to 6% among those with primary education) continued. The country was ruled by corruption as in Tunisia. The country’s economy was controlled to up to 40% by the Egyptian army. The politics of the country, the economy, and the military were run by Hosni Mubarak according to Brumberg (Brumberg, 2013).

Before the uprising of January 2011 in Yemen, everything was different prior to the Arab spring. The political instability influenced Yemen’s economic situation before the protests, which started in

\(^{21}\)The gross domestic product (GDP) is one of the primary indicators used to gauge the health of a country's economy. It represents the total dollar value of all goods and services produced over a specific time period; you can think of it as the size of the economy.
January 2011. The tension continued everywhere, poverty was widely spread and reached about 42%, population grew fast over 3.6% yearly, water reserves were limited, inequality appeared in gender, and the infrastructure was ignored. Most importantly, the oil profits, which represented the basis of exports from Yemen and most of the government’s income, diminished and few choices, have been offered by the economic reformation.

In Libya, the rebellion against Muammar Gaddafi was not related to the economy. The Libyan economy had been influenced by the high prices of oil in international markets, which helped the economy to flourish. Giving up weapons of mass destruction programs which was Gaddafi’s decision in 2003 gave Libya the opportunity to be in the front position of global financier attention. At that point, the overall growth reached 10% in 2010. Eighty-eight percent of the country’s GDP is accounted by oil. Corruption and favoritism were widely spread, poverty reigned, 30% of people were unemployed, and a big gap existed. Eventually, all of what took place caused the revolts against Qaddafi’s government (OECD, 2013). Though, the corruption was one of the features that caused the revolt because they prevented the wealth created by this high growth from reaching the majority of the population.

Before the uprising, the economic situation was difficult in Syria; the outer regions were the center of the objections. Changes severely affected these regions’ economic structures, which was reasonably the result of the uprising since it was affected by the
other regions. In addition, the economic gap in Syrian society was widened by the fast decline of the agriculture sector and the modern business community; the implication for economic support decreased and was feared, since the prosperity of the Syrian business community is owned by the regime and continued to be related to the president Bashar. A considerable part of the GDP was related to the struggling from water drought that minimized the agricultural output together with oil. The worldwide economic crisis affected Syria. In 2010, 8.4% was the proportion of unemployment officially, but unofficially it was far above that. The number of uneducated women being unemployed exceeded the unemployed university men.

The two poorest countries of the Gulf States were those affected by the Arab Spring in the Gulf. The Shia majority of Bahrain’s residents initiated Bahrain’s uprising against the Sunni rulers and owners of the wealth. The percentage growth’s rate was 4.6 for this country and its GDP in 2010 was 22.66 billion. In Oman, economic changes, restricted political rights, and persistent corruption hurried the beginning of the protests. Oman’s economy has depended on oil reserves; therefore, the expansion is what the government was looking for. Industry at 51%, services at 47.5%, and 1.6%, are important sectors (OECD, 2013).

The countries involved in the Arab Spring share many political and economic characteristics. Citizens across the Arab world are
definitely frustrated enough by these factors to oppose their dictatorial leaders (OECD, 2013).

Having very high levels of unemployment is common between these countries, especially among males. The solution is in jobs’ creation, which is expected to get these countries growing again. Youths aged 14-24 represent about 25% of the total of the population were unemployed; it is 5% of youth more in Tunisia than Egypt according to Schumpeter (2007). According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the unemployed youth percentage is less than 17% (OECD, 2013). Moreover, a much younger average age exists in the Arab world where the median age is 22 compared to 28 as median age of the world. Yemen is an extreme example since the median age is 17. Consequently, that 60% of the Arab population is under 25 according to Charrafeddine and Smyth (2006). Most are educated yet jobless. Finding places for rapidly growing-age population is a must for governments according to Hakimian (2011). Encouraging private sector growth is one way to do this, by establishing economic opportunities with a cultural free project (IMF, 2011b).

**Government responses to the challenge**

The rebellions’ consequences were unforeseen. In Egypt, unemployment has increased since January 2011. The rate of

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22 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an international organization headquartered in Washington, D.C., of “189 countries working to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate ... It is created for the purpose of standardizing global financial relations and exchange rates.
unemployment in Egypt in the third quarter of 2011 was the highest in 10 years, with 3.1 million of people without work – a rate of 35.5% higher than the same quarter last year (Reuters, 2011). Another consequence is the obvious contradiction in the development of economic regain between oil-producing and oil-purchasing countries. The European and Asian businessmen are decanting into Libya in ways to benefit from the natural resource opportunities there. Even though Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia are affected in the same way as Libya by political upheaval, they are not witnessing the same inflow of business. As an outcome of all these changes, the intervention of the government has been considered necessary, and this is a way that may be continuous.

A- Loss of Investment Capital
In the near future, there are many issues that will have an influence on the economies of the Arab Spring nations. One of these issues is that of capital flight, as the people of the society who own huge sums of money have been leaving their countries such as Egypt and Tunisia at an unexpected rate. According to the Jordanian finance minister, the revolts have cost the Arab world around 500$ million each week in capital flight alone (Agencies, 2011). In Egypt, three months are enough to have a transformation from a net inflow of investment to a net outflow: in the first quarter of 2011, around 163$ million of foreign investment flowed out of Egypt, while in the last quarter of 2010, there was a net inflow of 656$ million. In the first three months of 2011, Egypt and Libya lost more than 8.6$ billion in bank deposits – 6.4$
billion of this loss belong to Egypt alone. At the same time, Tunisia lost 29$ million in capital flight. The transfer of money from Syria to Lebanon through the cross-border has reached the highest rates: 100,000$ amount of Syrian currency was found under the seat of a car aiming to pass the border into Lebanon, another money exchange was done in Beirut that showed 8,000$ to 10,000$ amount of Syrian currency can be done nowadays per day, while 2,000$ to 4,000$ was done previously per week (Fielding & Smith, 2011). Furthermore, the total value of the Arab stock market retreated from 991$ billion in 2010 to 879$ billion in 2011 according to the Arab Monetary Fund (2014)\textsuperscript{23}. Thus, investors are searching for some stable places to put their money and the loss of this source of private investment worsens the difficult challenge that faces the Arab Spring countries in rebuilding their economies (Financial Times, 2011b)\textsuperscript{24}.

**B- Increased public spending**

In the Arab Spring countries, the public sector is unable to give the public the jobs and salaries they wanted and the private sector has yet to give rise to the opportunities necessary (IMF, 2011b). Many governments so far aimed to increase their public spending as a reaction. Even though this can encourage welfare spending and other social safety grids, it can increase government debt, which can have negative consequences.

\textsuperscript{23} *The Arab Monetary Fund* is a regional Arab organization, a working sub-organization of the Arab League. It was founded 1976, and has been operational since 1977.

\textsuperscript{24} *The Financial Times (FT)* is an English-language international daily newspaper with a special emphasis on business and economic news.
Almost all the countries experiencing revolutions were suffering difficulties concerning economic changes before the upheavals. Change was an objective policy of economic improvements before the Arab Spring, since the varied economies are considered stronger and less sensitive to shocks (IMF, 2011b). Under the sponsorship of the IMF, changes promoted financial strictness in Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Tunisia, and the Gulf states; however, the priorities of these states have changes from long-term economic growth to short-term stability because of political requests. As a result, governments are spending instead of saving and are keeping on privatization to gratify workers. This consequence will create economic troubles in the long term (Reuters, 2011).

Long-term progress must be managed by saving and investing in the economy and not only through consumption. If the government debt increased, many resources would be allowed to fight the debt rather than investing in national-building, and new leaders would work on short-term goals to win the elections rather than working on long-term which is better for the nation (Souza & Lipietz, 2011). The execution of long-term economic policies can stop the economic troubles in the states that were affected by the Arab Spring. National budgets are increasing to assist the changes in Arab Spring economies but till now there is nothing clear about the track that leaders will take and the economic plans are not yet published in detail. In November 2011, Syria announced that the government budget would be increased by
58% in 2012 and Tunisia’s budget is estimated to grow at 4.5% (Syria Today, 2011). Nevertheless, these plans are more likely used to pacify populations, rather than being realistic goals to be achieved.

There are many ways that can governments attempt to correct debt spending and increase national income, such as loans from foreign banks and Arab governments. The military of Egypt rejected the loans and offers given by some institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank and other countries are expected to do so as well. However, rich Gulf States have been pledging Egypt and Tunisia billions of dollars to rebuild as well as Jordan, Libya, and Morocco (Howard, 2012).

C-Tourism
In Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia, tourism is a large source of employment and income. Even nations that have not been affected by the revolutions are being harmed by changes in the tourism industry. According to the Arab Tourism Organization in Saudi Arabia and Jeddah (2011), the Arab Spring has cost the region 7$ billion in tourism. The Egyptian tourism revenues retreated from 12.5$ billion 2010 to 10$ billion in 2011 approximately, and the recovery would not begin until the elections were held and some level of political stability launched (Friedman, 2011). In Tunisia, tourism dropped by 50% in the first six months of 2011 of what it makes up usually (Al-Khoury, 2011). These cases were also seen across the MENA region, such as in
Lebanon that dropped 24% due to the instability in neighbouring Syria in the first half of 2011. In Jordan, tourism has declined in another way; even though Arab tourists visit Jordan, the real income is from Western tourists who visit the famous sites and book more expensive tour packages. In 2011, tour companies have lost up to 70% of visitors compared to the previous year (Sorenson, 2011). Moreover, the European tourists choose in their trips to visit Egypt or Israel, in addition to Jordan. Thus, the Jordanian tourism was affected in a negative way because of the conflicts in Egypt. Even though the Arab tourists have been less likely to cancel their vacations, they prefer to stay in Amman and other large cities, thus supporting a different sector of the economy that Europeans and Americans support too. This situation has declined since the end of the summer; while the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities and the Jordan Tourism Board have tried to enhance tourism through the advertisements of campaigns, their effects have not yet been achieved (Sorenson, 2011).

**D- Worldwide repercussions**

The economic consequences of the Arab Spring were not only limited to Arab countries, since the public finances and losses have been experienced in the whole world. The oil sector has suffered from the effects of instability, and the enforcement of the Islamist regimes is modifying the regional and global relationships. According to a study done recently, 22% of the worldwide business was affected by the Arab Spring, especially
with companies that have business related to retail, travel, and construction (Geopolicity, 2011).

**The Main Characteristics of the Arab Bad Socioeconomic Growth Model**

The Arab economic growth and social performance were ranked in low rates of GDP when they were compared with successful emerging countries. In spite of good trust in natural resources, they were ranked in very high on rates of increasing employment. Eight indicators of the underperformance of the Arab economies can be mentioned here.

**A- The Lowest Rate of Working Population to Total Population**

According to the statistics of the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2011), the rate of the working population to the total population in the Arab countries is 45%, in contrast with the average world rate of 61.2%, and the average rate in the East Asia region is high as 70%. Besides, labour statistics in Arab countries show low participation rates for women in the labour markets and a very high rate of informal employment, producing very low incomes. In Morocco, the total employment is 70% and in Egypt 48% (ILO, 2011)\(^{25}\).

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\(^{25}\) *International Labour Organization (ILO)*, specialized agency of the United Nations (UN) dedicated to improving labour conditions and living standards throughout the world.
B- The Highest Unemployment Rate to Working Population

The average unemployment rate in the Arab world stands as the highest rate in the world. Among young people (15-35 year old) the unemployment is higher, around 25%, while in other parts of the developing world this rate ranges between 8.9% and 15.7%. The very high rate of unemployment affecting young graduates of higher or secondary education is another characteristic of youth unemployment in Arab countries. For example, in Tunisia, the unemployment rate concerning higher education graduates upgraded from 3.8% 1994 to 17.5% in 2006, while the share of jobseekers with degrees of higher education in the total rose from 23% in 2001 to 55% in 2007, and the percentage of jobs offered for the category was far lower. In Egypt, the rate of unemployed workers with secondary education is approximated at 80% of the total number of unemployed individuals, and in Morocco, it is 29.6%, in Algeria 37.8%, and in Tunisia 42.5% according to data published by the World Bank (2008).

C-Stagnation of Real Salaries and Poverty Indicators

According to the ILO, the salaries in the MENA region have increased minimally. In addition, the productivity of workers in the MENA regions in the 90s was less improved compared to other regions, except for Central Asia and Central Europe, which witnessed a restructuring of their economics. Based on data drawn from ILO (2010b), in four Arab countries (Jordan, Syria, Morocco, and Algeria) and Turkey, the official minimum salary is
low, starting from a low of US$164 per month in Syria to a high of US$425 per month in Turkey. In Morocco, the minimum salary for non-agricultural work is US$235 per month and for agricultural work around US$152 per month. On the other hand, another statistical source the Unified Arab Economic Report (UAER)\textsuperscript{26}, was published by the pan-Arab financing institutions and the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States (2009). The report shows that the average yearly per capita income in rural areas in the Arab countries did not beat US$320 in 2008, against an average annual GDP per capita of US$5858 for the same year. According to a recent report presenting the progress of the Millennium Development Goals in Arab countries (Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA)\textsuperscript{27}, 2010) even though only 5% of the population in the Arab world falls within the definition of total poverty, which is attached to people with an available income of less than US$1.25 per day, the figure under an arrangement of this definition of poverty to include those earning less than US$2 per day would account 21% of the population. Moreover, 22% of the population has no access to healthcare, education, or a decent standard of living. Also this report shows that infant malnutrition and malnourishment is still high and that in this way the Millennium Development Goals are

\textsuperscript{26} Arab Monetary Fund issues ‘Unified Arab Economic Report’ for 2015. The 35th version of the “Unified Arab Economic Report” for 2015 was issued by the Arab Monetary Fund, which included the economic developments across Arab countries.

\textsuperscript{27} The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for West Asia (ESCWA), headquartered in Beirut, Lebanon, is one of five regional commissions under the administrative direction of the United Nations Economic and Social Council.
far from being achieved. Even though there has been an important progress in the primary and secondary education of girls, women’s empowerment still has a long way to go. Furthermore, studies show that the rate of mortality of mothers and premature pregnancies is high, and the mortality of infants has been decreased in a more efficient way. Even though the MENA countries are very rich in energy, phosphate, water resources, and in their large areas of fertile lands (Tunisia, Lebanon, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Syria, and Sudan); the levels of poverty are too high.

**D-High Economic Growth Rate Dependency on External Variables**

Arab economies have become highly dependent on external variables to maintain growth rates, such as oil prices, rainfall, tourism revenues, and migrant/expatriate remittances. This is why GDP annual growth rates are highly changeable for both oil-exporting and non-oil-exporting countries. In the last 50 years, international oil price variations have become the main determinant of the overall rates of growth in the region. Thus, growth rates in non-oil-exporting Arab countries have become dependent on Arab foreign direct investment (FDI) and Arab migrant/expatriate remittances that accrue also from Arab emigrants to Europe or the United States and Canada. The main engines of growth in the Arab countries are not locally based. These remain dependent to a large extent on external variables unrelated to the local economic dynamic.
E- Emigration and Brain Drain as a Major Indicator of Deficient Growth

The high unemployment rate caused immigration, but for some Arab countries the reliance developed on money transformations from migrants has become very high. According to an ILO study, the flow of migrants from the MENA countries is an important factor of bad growth and of the resulting deformities in the labour markets. The immigrant population of five Arab countries (Lebanon, Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco) is over 8.1 million (see table below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>55.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil-exporting</td>
<td>23.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional destination countries of immigration</td>
<td>7.33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Between 1998 and 2007, the number of migrants from the five countries mentioned above increased, especially to Europe. Most of them were students travelling to study and a large proportion of them did not return to their home countries. This was one of the primary features of the bad growth with which we are discussing since it is taking the form of a brain drain and a drain of qualified manpower (Corn, 2010).

Many studies showed that the main cause for immigration and the value of migrants’ remittances to their countries was to resolve the problem of poverty and unemployment back home. Between
1990 and 2008, transfers had generally increased by 800% to a total of US$800 billion in eleven countries that were concerned by the migration movements. The average per person increase in GDP during the same period of time was just 170%; in 2008, it was under 2000$ per year in the countries mentioned before, and under 1000$ per year in other countries (World Bank, 2015). Thus, statistics show the negative effect of migration on the countries of origin.

Concerning the brain drain, it is mainly related to the phenomenon of students studying abroad but not returning to their home countries, and this costs their countries over 1$ billion per year. Furthermore, another study notes that the emigration of 450000 ‘brains’ from the Arab world has cost the countries from which they migrated more than 200$ billion Snyder (2000).

F- The High Concentration of Investments in a Few Sectors Hindering Economic Diversification

Although foreign investment grew in the Arab region, it did not refresh the region’s economies. It encouraged the concentration of investment in few sectors such as oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors; luxury housing and tourism; the banking and financial sector; and large retail outlets. According to an ESCWA report for 2008, the parts that attracted the foreign investment were energy, allied industries, and financial services (See ESCWA 2009, also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2008).
In most countries, the structure of FDI between 2001 and 2006 was concentrated on energy and allied industries, construction, financial, and tourism services.

FDI was clearly concentrated on rent-based sectors while migrants’ transfers were concentrated on consumption. This created employment opportunities in the mobile phone and tourism sectors while the improvement in FDI could not resolve the problems of employment.

G- The Very Low Level of Research and Development (R&D) and the Absence of Systems to Support National Innovation

Most MENA countries suffer from the lowest level of research and development (R&D) and from the fragmentation of systems for achieving and distributing science and technology (S&T) in their societies. Between 1963 and 2009, the total number of contracts registered in all the countries of the MENA region was 568 compared with other countries such as the Republic of Korea, which registered 66729 patents and Taiwan, which registered 77285. Even though all these countries were at the same stage of development 50 years ago, the figure shows how little innovation has come out of the MENA countries.

The change required is reflected in the very low level of payment on R&D; under 0.5% of GDP in most countries of the region compared with a world average of 1.9% and 2.5% in the more active and creative countries. Moreover, it was clear in the small number of scientific publications in the region. Thus, this
proves why the relative technology content of the region’s exports is too low, ranging as it does from 0.3% to a maximum of 7% of the region’s total exports (figures are drawn from World Bank, 2015).

The brain drain was also one of the indicators of the extent of the region’s shortcoming in innovation. This problem was diminished when the emigration has been fostered by public policies and by the policies carried by many Arab governments. According to many reports and studies on the scientific and industrial delay of the MENA countries, there is wide evidence that the few R&D institutions that exist have little productive potential (See United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 2010, UNESCO 2005, International Finance Corporation and Islamic Development Bank 2011). The fragmentation of R&D institutions tends to be self-perpetuating because there are no specific national technological or scientific objectives, and there are no public policies to assure the formation of a developed network integrated in all parts of the economy to provide it with an innovation capacity rather than them being isolated from one another. Adding to that, the lack of contact among teaching institutions, private sector business associations, professional associations, and trade unions, can be related to the absence of a national goal for them to attain in terms of achieving and distributing industrial technology as well as to the lack of any comprehensive industrial strategy or R&D policy to achieve such goals, as there is no established mechanism for consultation.
between the states, business, and professional associations, and workers’ and agricultural trade unions. Between 2005 and 2010, the UNESCO has published many reports on the Arab world economic, scientific, and technological progresses compared with other countries in the same period of time such as Brazil, China, Mexico, India, Ireland, and the Republic of Korea. These reports focused on the knowledge gap in the Arab world as evidenced by the following indicators that were the main subjects in each of the reports done in 2005, 2009, and 2010. These indicators were: the low level of translation and publication of scientific articles and books; the almost total absence of scientific articles from the Arab world cited in other scientific publications; the lack of technological innovation as reflected in the very small number of patents registered in the Arab world; and the minimal expenditure on R&D, making the region the least concerned with R&D in the world, especially when compared with military expenditure; the small amount spent on information and communications technology (ICT) and on higher education, as illustrated by the lack of autonomy of the universities and the rigidity of teaching curricula that are ill-suited to a knowledge-based global economy; the fact that the various levels of education are not linked to professional experience and human resource development in the public and private sectors; the very high rate of illiteracy; the poor distribution of university-level students among the various branches of knowledge especially those concerned with science
and technology; and poor standards for teaching of foreign languages.

A report on youth employment and the adaptation of teaching systems in the MENA region to the requirements of development shows that youth unemployment costs the region some 50$ billion per year (International Finance Corporation and Islamic Development Bank, 2011).

H- Deficiencies of External Trade: Another Major of Symptom of Bad Growth

According to some statistics drawn by the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States (2009), it was clear that the asperity of the economic structures described is a main obstacle to the growth and diversification of these countries’ productivity. This can be seen from the deficit of over 67$ billion in the 2009 trade balance for seven countries of the MENA region despite petroleum and gas exports worth over 57$ billion in the same year. Due to a close analysis of this group’s trade, it shows that their industrial sector is dependent on other countries because their deficit in industrial trade is over 82$ billion. In addition, if one tends to exclude products deriving from natural resources and allied industries, it would be even lower; such as inorganic chemical products and fertilizers valued at about 5$ billion in export earnings. Moreover, a large share of the exports of manufactured goods of these countries is attributed to industrial subcontracting activities (23.9$ billion), mostly in apparel and
accessories, footwear, textile yarn, and fabrics, as well as electrical machinery, apparatuses, and appliances. All these manufacturing activities were taken in free zones under contract to Europe or United States’ companies without being integrated in the local economies.

There is also a serious dependency on many sectors. (See table)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medical and pharmaceutical products</th>
<th>19.3%</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Machinery and transport equipment</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional and scientific instruments</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photographic equipment, optical goods and watches</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastic in primary form</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road vehicles sector</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized machinery and machine parts</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metalworking machines and appliances</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other industrial machinery and machine parts</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power-generating machinery and equipment</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, the foreign trade of the countries analyzed is very high in terms of food products (12.16$ billion), and animal vegetable oils, fats, and waxes (1.64$ billion) despite the considerable agricultural resources of Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia.

These negative performances cannot be compared with those of the four other economies. The Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Tunisia, and Singapore managed to generate a foreign trade surplus of 127$ billion whereby the trade surplus in industrial products accounted for US$257 billion against a deficit of 80$ billion for the seven countries of the MENA region with machinery and transport goods accounting for a surplus of 178$ billion against a deficit of 46$ billion in the MENA countries. At the same time, the four economies registered a deficit of 99$ billion in trade in fuels against a surplus of 33$ billion for the seven countries of the MENA region. The net result was a trade surplus of 127$ billion, whereas for the MENA countries it was a deficit of 67$ billion, despite their fuel export surplus.

All the above comparisons and indicators show how industrialization is low and weak in MENA countries.

**Long-term expected consequences**

**A- Balance of power**

The regional balance of power is changing because of the rich Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, which take the center stage and
have invested in North African countries such as Egypt (Feiler, 2003). Saudi Arabia has primarily benefited from the troubles in Libya: when the oil production there slowed, Saudi Arabia interfered to cover the losses by enhancing its own production by approximately 700,000 barrels per day. In January 2011, it produced around 9 million barrels per day and this production increased to reach 10 million over the summer. However, Saudi Arabia decreased its oil production to 9.45 million barrels per day when Libya restarted its oil production that reached 350,000 barrels per day by October 2011 (OECD, 2013).

B- Economics and the Islamist rise to power

Since the Islamist governments are controlling the power in the countries that had uprisings, a main question must be taken into consideration: How will the rise of Islamist regimes to power in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt affect the economy?

To answer this question, it is important to know how strict and traditional the Islamist regimes would be. Would it be as reasonable as the current position of the Muslim Brotherhood, or it would be more radical like the Wahhabi position in Saudi Arabia or the Taliban in Afghanistan? While moderation is the main power in Egypt and Tunisia, each of these situations would offer a different effect on the economy. In this part, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt will be the case study.

In the past, the Muslim Brotherhood exhorted on the free-market economy, ensuring job creation, equalizing monopolies and
eliminating corruption (Richter, 2006). These were achieved by encouraging small and medium-sized businesses and installing a free-market with Islamic foundations (Eimeshad, 2011). The tourism industry has been a great concern since the Muslim Brotherhood has mentioned promoting Islamic or clean tourism, even though this industry makes up to 10% of Egypt’s GDP (Eimeshad, 2011). Aiding the poor through supporting social and healthcare strategies, and promoting Islamic banks and finances were other economic strategies expected from the Muslim Brotherhood (OnIslam, 2011). The introduction of zakat, or charity in the form of 2.5% income tax was one example of an Islam-inspired change. Even though the Muslim Brotherhood knows that the investment from the West in tourism and banking will be decreased because of the approval on Islamic finance, it hopes to stimulate investment from the Arab and Islamic world (OnIslam, 2011). The aid that the Gulf States have pledged to Egypt has not all so far been delivered (Reuters, 2011). Since the Muslim Brotherhood has taken power in Egypt, it has been aiming to mediate its ideas of Islamic finance with the West’s banking habits in order to ensure continued investment from non-Islamic countries. For example, common financial instruments such as derivatives and futures are popular but go against Shari’a law. In fact, only 3% to 4% of Egypt’s banking consists of Islamic banking. The Muslim Brotherhood works on increasing this percentage in the long term without estimating what would be the consequences of such a move (OnIslam, 2011). In the short term,
the organization is searching for economic recovery in more traditional ways; recently the business strategist for the Muslim Brotherhood put a plan that would enhance manufacturing of import replacements so as to reduce reliance on imports, and to increase worker efficiency through extra training (Reuters, 2011).

In spite of worries over the ultimate goal of the Muslim Brotherhood’s economic policies, the first step was to show the practical understanding of the debt and unemployment problems. According to history, the Muslim Brotherhood has been working against globalization, which is equated with “Americanization” and viewed it as a movement to remove Muslim identity, culture and religion (Mansour, 2008). However, the group must get past this idea and focus on the economic picture to build a successful Egypt. This will need U.S. military and economic banking and will have to involve reconsidering the Egyptian military’s previous rejection of an IMF loan in the future.

Now, as the general public has realized its power to overthrow unpopular governments, the new governments of the Arab Spring will be responsible for their own survival. As a consequence, the new regimes will work on keeping their populations happy through the balancing of short and long-term success. Thus, the point of change at which the long-term national interests begin to take priority over short-term political suitability has not yet occurred.
C- Models of governance
Economic success is highly related to political stability, which encourages foreign and local investments and increases tourism. Thus, the achievement of stabilizing policies can help the Arab Spring countries to beat their economic difficulties in five to seven years as has been shown by the economic recovery of other troubled countries (Indrawati, 2011).

1- The Indonesian example
Indonesia’s regime changed in 1998 after the resignation of the general Suharto who had been ruling Indonesia for 32 years before the economic and political crises. After his resignation, the economy faced a downturn and his vice president, Bacharuddin Jusuf Haibibe, ruled the country, then he was replaced in the first democratic elections. While there were only 3 parties during Suharto’s rule, the number increased to 48 by the June 1999 elections, 19 of those were Islamic. However, the Islamic parties in Indonesia were unsuccessful, unlike what happened in Tunisia and Egypt, and the public voted for secular leaders. In addition, another difference between the Indonesian case and the Arab Spring was the response of the crowd. After the Indonesian revolts, many government officials continued ruling the country and others resigned in a peaceful way without fighting. In contrast, Arab leaders in other countries through the revolts kept fighting in a harsh way to keep the nations under their control.
Notwithstanding these differences, the Indonesian model can be used as an example for Egypt and other Arab countries in upheaval. The new Indonesian leader quickly stopped the corruption by bringing cases to courts and hiring independent judges to supervise corruption trials (Indrawati, 2011). The leadership made decisions that were necessary to get their political and economic organizations back on track, such as only giving aid when needed (Indrawati, 2011).

The Indonesian government helped boost an economic turnaround. In 2004, the public voted for a new president who had a program under the slogan “pro-growth, pro-poor, pro-employment” (U.S. State Department, 2012). Thus, the Indonesian economy has been growing, and between 2000 and 2010, the GDP increased to achieve a rate of 4.8% per year (Azzam, 2011). Even though the economic situation is not perfect in Indonesia, the country constitutes a positive example of a Muslim country that overcame economic issues.

2- The Turkish example

Turkey is another Muslim country that can be used as an example for the countries involved in the Arab Spring. Over the past years, under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan
and his AKP party\textsuperscript{28}, Turkey had seen an unexpected economic success.

The AKP began as an Islamist party like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Annahda in Tunisia. In spite of the religious roots they have, the APK won 34\% of the vote in secular Turkey for their first electoral victory in 2002 (AKP, website). Their success came in the time of the main financial crisis of February 2001, when the value of lira dropped by half and millions of people were not working. The vice president and former finance minister Kemal Dervis employed IMF-dictated tactics such as currency pegging, privatization, budgetary discipline, central bank independence, and the supervision of national banks. All these actions changed the economic status and enabled Turkey to regain stability in 2002. The APK worked on maintaining economic growth and improving the country’s financial situation by continuing to apply the policies that had been set up by Dervis.

Moreover, there are many differences between the situation in Turkey and that of Arab Spring countries. For instance, the charter instructs an Islamic state such as in many Arab countries including Egypt. Also, secularism in Egypt will lead to corruption, while the mix of secular and religious beliefs in Turkey is not likely to be repeated there. Furthermore, Turkey and Indonesia are

\textsuperscript{28} The Justice and Development Party, abbreviated officially AK Parti in Turkish, is a conservative political party in Turkey. Developed from the tradition of moderate Islamism, the party is the largest in Turkey.
capitalist economies and Arab nations must have to adopt capitalism in order to achieve such economic success.

In spite of these differences, the APK could present a perfect example of an Islamist party that ruled and enabled economic growth after a downturn, and Indonesia is a great example of a successful secular Muslim State. So far, the plans of the Muslim Brotherhood or other governments of the Arab Spring countries were not clear in taking these nations as models to achieve economic success.
Conclusion of this Book

Finally, the expression “Arab Spring” does not express the experience of the general population who engaged in those phenomena, nor does it allude to a basic political change. It is a meaningless term that alludes just to the expectation of individuals in charge without profoundly investigating the socio-economic conditions that prompt their conduct.

Furthermore, the expression has no general meaning as far as alluding to particular attributes, because protests took distinctive aspects and achieved diverse results in various nations. Subsequently, it is an umbrella term used to portray the uprising, without thinking about the diverse countries and their communities, such as in the cases chosen for this examination, namely Tunisia and Egypt.

This book can be summarized by an absolute specificity of Arab economies relating to their large rent base that prevents action, economic variety, real industrialization and high value-added service activities, can be the summary of the diagnostic. It was not easy to avoid the bad growth, which depends specifically on a number of sources of state and individual rent-based revenues mainly such as merchandises exports, mass tourism, real estate, import, and local trade activities.

Thus, this contributed to the inflexibility of a socioeconomic structure characterized by a lack of dynamism and diversification
and by increasing income inequalities between different regions in each country. It is more visible in the increasing gap between the rural areas where a large population continues to live in many countries while affluent families live in large urban centers.

According to history, rent-based economies produce authoritarian political regimes, where the dominant aristocracy is considered natural and human resources are of its patrimonial inheritance of which it can freely dispose. What happened in the Arab world was considered an important historical moment, that opened up new avenues to shift away from bad growth to virtuous growth and from dictatorship to democratic systems.

This would be done by knowing how to shift from one economic model to a new one based on dynamism, diversification, and full mobilization of neglected human resources. It is not an easy task, since the future of these Arab revolts in terms of successfully establishing democratic systems is dependent on the capacity to implement such a shift from a deficient rent-based growth model to a virtuous innovation-based, active, fair, and sustainable development model.

Finally, most researchers do not claim that assistance is inconvenient, but that it needs further examination in order for it to become more effective (Djankov & al, 2006). Since the Arab spring has affected the Arab World in all its socioeconomic sectors and the balance of power was not reached in most of the MENA region because of the bad government models. In the
following book, we will see how the Arab Spring either has led to democratization or to civil war in many of the Arab countries such as Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and others.
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The Arab Spring and Revolution

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