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INCITATIONS ET CONTRAINTES A LA GESTION DU RESULTAT

Volume : (13), Issue : 205, August - 2018

Abstract :

This communication is a literature review about earnings management. Two results are outlined : the absence  of  incentive  strict  monotony  contrary  to Watts & Zimmerman naïve hypothesis (1986) and the necessity to take into account constraints to earnings management to understand accouting policies.

Résumé  :  Cette communication est une revue de la littérature sur  la  gestion  du  résultat.  Deux  résultats apparaissent :  l’absence  de  monotonie  stricte  des incitations contrairement à la formulation naïve des prédictions de Watts & Zimmerman (1986) et la nécessité de prendre en compte des contraintes pour comprendre les politiques comptables.

Keywords :Gestion du résultat, accruals, incitations, contraintes.  

Article: Download PDF Journal DOI : 301/704

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CONTRAINTES A LA GESTION DU RESULTAT

Vol.I (13), Issue.I 205



Article No : 10023


Number of Downloads : 103


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